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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effects of graduate education on the retention and 
promotion of Line of the Air Force (LAF) officers at the rank of Captain and Major.  
Logistic regression models are estimated to examine the effects of graduate education on 
the retention of Captains and Majors and on promotion to Major using data from  the 
Active Duty Military Master File for fiscal years 1992 through 2006 from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center.  A difference-in-difference estimator is incorporated into the 
promotion model to evaluate the effects of an Air Force policy change intended to 
eliminate any bias towards advanced education at promotion boards.  Besides graduate 
education, explanatory variables include basic demographic traits and professional 
characteristics.   
Results indicate that graduate education has a positive effect on retention of LAF 
officers at the rank of Captain and Major.  Findings from the promotion model indicate 
that graduate education also has a positive effect on promotion but results for the change 
in policy (masking education information for promotion) are inconclusive.  In addition, 
race and career field are shown to influence both retention behavior and promotion while 
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1I. INTRODUCTION  
“The U.S. military is far better trained, better educated, more competent, and 
more professional than any current or potential rival, which provides an asymmetric 
advantage in military operations.”  (Schilmer, Thie, Harrell, Tseng, 2006).  One of the 
foundations for this continued advantage is the level of graduate education attained by the 
U.S. military officer corps.  Graduate education raises “the levels of individual military 
officer professionalism and technical competence so that those officers more effectively 
perform their required duties and responsibilities” along with providing “developmental 
incentives for military officers with high ability, dedication, and the capacity for 
professional growth to remain in the Service.” (DODD, 1322.10, August 26, 2004).   
In order to maintain this benefit and encourage its officers to pursue graduate 
education, the Department of Defense (DoD) offers several educational programs to 
facilitate advanced degrees.  These programs include fully-funded in-residence graduate 
degrees, such as those that can be obtained at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT) and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  Alternatively, partially funded off-
duty programs are available in which the Services provide tuition assistance, which 
allows an officer to attend an institution of his/her choosing as long as it does not 
interfere with his/her normal duties.  Examples might include attendance at a local 
university or a distance learning program.  In addition to DoD sponsored programs, an 
officer may choose to pursue a graduate degree at his/her own expense, which might 
include the use of any Veteran’s Affairs benefits. 
The support of these programs by DoD and the Services is based upon the 
premise of human capital theory, which suggests that individuals’ productivity increases 
with additional education and training, along with experience.  It is generally understood 
that education changes an individual in such a way as to increase his/her capacity to 
perform job-related tasks.  (Wise, 1975)  This increase in capacity yields productive 
capital for both the individual and the organization.  While benefits for the individual  
 
 
2might include higher earnings, increased promotional opportunities, and greater job 
satisfaction, the organization also gains through increased revenues, improved 
productivity, and higher morale.   
To illustrate how the Services promote advanced education, the below table 
shows that a significant proportion of officers attain advanced degrees while on active 
duty. 
 
Table 1. FY 2004 Education Attainment of Officers by Service 
 
Educational Attainment of Active Component Officer Corps,  
by Service (Percent) – FY 2004 
 Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force 
 
DoD 
Less than College Graduate 1.3 11.9 2.8 2.7 4.2
College Graduate (B.A., B.S., etc.) 58.7 68.5 79.6 46.7 58.2
Advanced Degree (M.A., Ph.D., etc.) 40.1 19.6 17.7 50.6 37.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.  Percentages do not include “Unknown”data. 
Source:  OSD/P&R, Population Representation in the Military Services Report – FY 2004 
 
The Air Force, like the other services, continues to commit time, effort, and 
resources to educational programs that promote advanced education.  The attainment of a 
graduate degree in the Air Force is useful not only in meeting the overarching 
organizational goal of maintaining “knowledge-capital” but also plays a critical role in  
fulfilling certain specialties in particular career fields and can serve as a differentiator in 
the  promotion process.   
A. BACKGROUND 
“In a smaller, leaner, and more expeditionary-focused Air Force, it is essential 
that our Airmen have the knowledge and competency to accomplish our mission.”  
(SECAF/CSAF Ltr to Airmen, 2006)  One of the most effective ways to build and 
maintain this knowledge is through the ability of the Air Force to educate officers beyond 
the baccalaureate level.  It is expected that investments in education will yield as much if 
not more benefit to the Air Force’s capability, as investments in physical capital such as 
aircraft or equipment, since an educated Airman is considered the foremost weapon 
3system.  Unlike aircraft and equipment that must be constantly updated or modified to 
meet environmental changes, an educated officer can adapt to changes in the 
environment.   
The Air Force offers various educational opportunities to officers throughout their 
career.  These include Air Force Specialty (AFSC) specific training, Professional Military 
Education (PME) commensurate with their grade, along with an opportunity to pursue an 
advanced degree.  While each program focus is different, the common thread is the 
deliberate development of officers.  While all officers have the opportunity to pursue off-
duty education opportunities, not all officers are able to participate in fully funded, in-
residence programs.  Reasons for selection or non-selection may include AFSC, grade 
requirements, and how they rank among their peers.  Depending on the nature of the 
program, participants’ degrees may or may not relate directly to the officer’s primary 
AFSC.   
While the Air Force has always supported advanced education to develop 
knowledge, the intent has often been misunderstood.  Over time, earning a post-graduate 
degree was often interpreted by officers as a method to increase the likelihood of 
promotion.  People often used their educational benefits to pursue degrees that may not 
have been relevant to their core or Air Force duties.  As a result, advanced education 
degrees were masked from promotion records for those competing for the grade of Major 
beginning in 2003.  In doing so, all academic information, to include baccalaureate, was 
deleted for purposes of the selection board to eliminate any bias towards education.  
While this had the intended effect of eliminating “square filling,” the Air Force also 
discovered that this change also deterred others from pursuing degrees, that would have 
benefited officers personally or the Air Force.  (SECAF/CSAF Ltr to Airmen, 2006)  As 
a result, beginning again in 2008, all advanced education will again be part of the 
promotion process. 
Today the Air Force finds itself challenged to maintain an effective aerospace 
fighting force, in an in which equipment re-capitalization and recruiting and retention 
concerns are at the forefront.  While there is an intrinsic expectation that advanced 
education, regardless of its focus, provides benefits to both the individual and the 
4organization, the prudent use of limited resources requires that smart choices be made 
regarding how graduate degrees are resourced.  While the benefits of graduate education 
for the individual officers include improved knowledge and skills along with preparation 
to assume higher levels of responsibility, the difficulty for the Air Force lies in accurately 
assessing the performance (productivity) and the return on investment it realizes from 
investing in each officer’s advanced education.  Now more than ever, it is important to 
understand the effect of graduate education programs on performance and retention 
behavior.   
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between graduate 
education and the job performance of United States Air Force line officers.  The primary 
focus for this analysis is addressing any differences in officer performance and retention 
behavior that may be attributed to graduate education at an officer’s career milestones of 
Captain and Major.  Secondary questions that are examined include addressing the 
perception that graduate education is necessary for promotion, reviewing whether the 
inventory of graduate education skills differs significantly among communities, and 
whether a change in Air Force policy regarding masking education records in 2003 had 
an effect on promotion outcomes.   
The data used in this study are taken from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) Air Force Officer Active Duty Military Master File using cohort data on newly 
commissioned officers between fiscal years 1992 through 2006.  The data exclude non-
line Air Force personnel (e.g., chaplains, medical personnel, and judge advocates).  
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
The data do not distinguish between fully funded, partially funded, and unfunded 
graduate education.  The interesting question of whether there is a difference in 
promotion rates and retention behavior between officers having graduate degrees from 
different sources or the method obtained could not be addressed.  Some other factors that  
 
 
5could potentially affect promotion rates and retention behavior, such as awards, 
certifications, PME completion, and deployment history could not be included in the 
study because the information was not available.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters.  Chapter II is a literature review of prior 
studies that focus on human capital theory.  Literature relevant to labor market economics 
and the results of prior studies are reviewed to provide context for this research and to 
assist in the selection of the variables for use in the multivariate models.  Chapter III 
consists of an overview of career progression and graduate education within the Air 
Force Officer corps.  It provides a basic understanding of the current policies and 
procedures that govern the Air Force Performance Evaluation System, career field 
management, and graduate education programs.  Chapter IV is a description of the 
database and variables used in this thesis and includes further discussion of human capital 
theory, its relationship to graduate education in the Air Force, and the effects of graduate 
education on promotion and retention.  Also presented is the model specification and 
empirical methodology utilized.  Chapter V discusses descriptive statistics and model 
results and their relevance to the effects of graduate education.  Chapter VI concludes the 
thesis with a summary of significant findings, strengths and limitations, and conclusions.  
Also presented are policy recommendations and areas for further research.  
6THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
7II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the most technologically superior and powerful Air Force in the world, 
we are all aware that we must maintain our intellectual superiority with 
lifelong education for all Airmen – officer and enlisted… 
We must take the Air Force’s basic educational foundation to the next 
level and be relentless in our continued pursuit to become knowledge-
enabled Airmen… 
Make education a priority throughout your career, and doors will continue 
to open for you.  Your achievements will become a part of your record of 
success for all evaluations. 
-- Honorable Michael W. Wynne, SECAF. (Letter to Airmen, 2006) 
A. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY  
According to human capital theory, an individual’s productivity and earnings 
increase with additional education, training, and experience.  This phenomenon is 
examined extensively in the labor economics literature in the same manner as traditional 
capital investments.  It is based on the economic premise that workers embody a set of 
knowledge, skills, and abilities that can be rented out to employers.  If an employee 
increases his or her skills, then they make themselves more valuable.  This set of 
knowledge and skills, which comes from education and training, including learning that 
that experience yields, generates a certain stock of productive capital (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 2006).  This productive capital is often referred to as human capital.  The value of 
this human capital is derived from how much these skills can earn in the labor market.   
Human capital can be improved though three major kinds of labor market 
investments: education and training, migration, and searching for new jobs (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 2006).  All three investments involve an initial cost, and all three are made 
with the goal that the investments will yield greater returns in the future (e.g., increased 
wages, improved productivity, etc.).  From an individual’s perspective, these investments 
may have an immediate cost in the form of direct expenses (e.g., tuition, books, etc.) and 
opportunity costs (e.g., foregone earnings, lost job prospects, etc.).  Similarly, an 
employer may choose to assume or share these costs for an individual.  However, in 
8either scenario, if the initial costs can be recovered with an acceptable rate of return over 
a specified time period in the form of increased utility (e.g., improved productivity, 
wages, etc.) then the investment will be undertaken.  Just as corporations or individuals 
assess specific costs and benefits from financial investments, human capital theory 
assumes that the same assessment criteria can be utilized to characterize the behavior of 
corporations and individuals when considering investments in human capital.  “Like any 
other investment, an investment in human capital entails costs that are borne in the near 
term with the expectation that the benefits will accrue in the future” (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 2006, 277).   
Although all aspects of human capital theory can be related to the military, for 
purposes of this thesis, only one specific type of human capital investment will be 
discussed, that of graduate education for United States Line of the Air Force (LAF) 
Officers.  Both DoD and the USAF, have three main reasons for supporting graduate 
education for military officers all of which support human capital theory.  Primarily DoD 
derives utility by educating its officers through increased productivity, longer retention, 
and improved morale (Thirtle, 2001).   
To better understand the decision to invest in graduate education within the DoD 
context, four areas of human capital theory need to be discussed: 1) the specificity of the 
education; 2) the cost and benefits of education; 3) the labor market; and 4) signaling and 
bias. 
1. General and Firm Specific Education 
DoD and the Air Force invest in two forms of education to improve the 
productivity of their officers.  The type of investment can be either general or firm-
specific in nature.  General education refers to knowledge or skills that increase the 
productivity of the individual with any employer, including the Air Force, or across 
different job disciplines.  This is the type of training received in most undergraduate 
degree programs, where skills learned may apply equally to a number of enterprises.  In 
the case of Air Force officers, a graduate degree in management or business, for example, 
could be considered a general investment because it enhances the individual’s 
productivity across a spectrum of disciplines.  General training makes an individual 
9attractive to a number of firms, and the question becomes, “why would a rational firm 
provide general training” (Becker, 1962)?  The answer, according to Becker, is that firms 
would only provide general training if they did not have to bear any of the costs.  DoD, 
and specifically the Air Force address this concern by establishing minimum service 
commitments, which are designed to recoup costs over time.  In doing so, DoD ensures a 
return on its investment from the officer, who is presumed to be more productive during 
the obligated period.  In the words of Becker, “A contract, in effect, converts all training 
into completely specific training” (Becker, 1962). 
Conversely, firm-specific education increases an individual’s productivity only in 
a specific firm or organization.  A large portion of education and training that occurs 
within DoD is considered firm-specific since it has limited application outside of the 
military.  Further, some education and training may only have limited application to 
certain jobs within the military.  An example of firm-specific graduate education might 
be a Master’s Degree in Electronic Warfare.  Although the core of these courses would be 
considered a general capital investment and have some universal application, the program 
mostly enhances the individual’s productivity to DoD and the Air Force.  Firm-specific 
training therefore is in the best interest of the employer when the skills learned cannot be 
immediately replaced, and would require additional expense to hire or train a 
replacement.  “Reducing turnover of specifically trained personnel is not patronage, but 
necessary to maintain and improve a firm’s overall productivity” (Becker, 1962).  Becker 
stresses that employees with specific training have less incentive to leave a firm, and 
conversely, firm’s have more of an incentive to retain them, when compared to 
employees with general training only. 
2. Cost and Benefits 
A second area that needs to be discussed is the cost and benefits of investing in 
human capital.  When obtaining graduate education within DoD, one has several options.  
One can undertake fully-funded in-residence graduate education, partially funded off-
duty graduate education or self-funded graduate education.  Those considered full-funded 
attend graduate school full-time at DoD approved Department of Defense or civilian 
institutions.  All education expenses are funded by the Air Force and the individual 
10
continues to receive full pay and benefits.  In return for this investment, the individual 
“owes” the Air Force an active duty obligation period of three years upon graduation for 
master’s programs and five years for doctoral programs.  Additionally, some officers may 
have to serve in positions requiring a particular Advanced Academic Degree (AAD), 
since filling the AAD position was the basis for funding the graduate education.  The Air 
Force pays the direct costs of the education as well as the opportunity costs of not being 
able to utilize the individual during the education period, but is able to reduce its risk by 
screening applicants not only for academic ability but also for future promotability, while 
also obligating officers to additional service.  Equally, the individual incurs a cost in the 
form of additional obligated service and missed job opportunities due to being a full-time 
student, but is able to complete his/her degree in a timelier manner therefore realizing a 
return sooner.   
Individuals in partially funded off-duty graduate education programs attend 
school in their off-duty time while still receiving full pay and benefits.  Tuition is paid for 
partially or fully by the Air Force through tuition assistance (TA).  Any individual 
utilizing TA is obligated to an additional two years of obligated service upon course 
completion.  Whether an officer takes one or several courses during a given semester for 
example, he/she is obligated to an additional two-year commitment upon completion of 
the term.  In this instance, the Air Force pays part of the direct costs of the education but 
does not have to forego the same opportunity costs since the individual is still available 
for their primary occupation.  While the Air Force assumes a greater risk by not being 
able to screen applicants to the same degree as with in-residence programs, this risk is 
offset through service obligation and having the officer available for duty.  Conversely, 
the individual may incur some direct costs (e.g., tuition, books, etc.) along with having 
less leisure time, while also incurring a cost in the form of additional obligated service.  
On the other hand, an individual pursuing this option has more flexibility in pursuing 
other job opportunities and not missing on-the-job experiences but may not realize the 
return on the investment as quickly.   
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Lastly, an individual may of course choose to obtain a graduate degree at his/her 
own expense or through utilizing benefits such a through the Veteran’s Administration.  
Under this option, school is completed in his/her off-duty time; however, the officer 
incurs no additional service obligation to the Air Force.  While this alternative avoids an 
additional service commitment, the individual assumes all direct costs. 
In all cases, both the individual and organization undertake some degree of risk 
with future benefits.  This is implicit in the decision to undertake formal education, given 
the immediate costs and the value of future returns.  While the immediate direct costs 
may or may not be shared by the Air Force, both parties realize a return in the form of 
increased productivity through increased critical thinking and problem-analysis 
capabilities (Gates, et al., 1999).  From an individual’ perspective, this process can be 
accelerated by completing his/her degree sooner in their career; however, for the Air 
Force, time may not be as critical given incurred service obligations.  A further benefit 
derived from this increase in education is an increase in motivation or improvement in 
morale as a result of the increased possibility of future earnings, promotions, and job 
opportunities.  While morale may be difficult to measure, its effect on productivity is 
without doubt.  Additionally, morale and productivity affects retention, which can further 
increase the return on investment for both the individual and the organization.   
3. Labor Market  
Given that the military is considered an internal labor market where promotions 
occur from within, human capital decisions differ slightly as compared to the civilian 
sector.  An internal labor market can be classified an organization with a single point of 
entry, where positions are filled through selection and promotion of individuals already in 
the firm (Oswald, 1984; Rosen, 1992).  The term internal labor market first arose in 
academic literature in 1966 (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) as a means to classify economies 
internal to large organizations where workers have some probability of promotion to 
higher positions within the firm with a corresponding increase in wages.   
This hierarchical structure with limited entry points exists for several reasons 
according to Oswalld (1984) and Rosen (1992).  Specifically, some types of production 
require that some workers supervise and direct, while others work.  Secondly, within this 
12
internal market, workers gain experience and knowledge through production that 
provides an experienced pool of lower-level workers that the firm may draw upon to fill 
supervisory positions.  Thirdly, through observation of the workers on the job, current 
employees’ ability and potential within that industry can be assessed.  This allows 
employers to observe actual employee characteristics to determine who is retained and 
how fast and how high the employees are promoted (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2006). 
In his analysis, Oswald (1984) arrived at three conclusions that apply to the 
internal labor market.  First, within internal labor markets, seniors are paid more than 
juniors and if wages decreased with seniority, it would become difficult to fill senior 
positions.  Workers would have no incentive to stay and would leave during their 
employment in search of opportunities that paid wages independent of age.  Secondly, 
some employees, regardless of seniority, may be paid more than the marginal value of 
their product.  This raises the supply of entrants who find the probability of future returns 
attractive.  As a final point, he asserts that workers can quit if they are not promoted and 
seek employment elsewhere.  
This internal labor market as described is analogous to the environment of 
military officers.  Air Force officers begin their careers by serving in entry-level 
assignments that build their technical competence in their chosen career field.  Over time 
these competencies are expanded to gain experience and competencies required to fill 
senior positions.  The execution of their duties is continually assessed and quantified by 
their immediate supervisors.  Fully qualified Air Force officers are promoted to Captain 
(O3), with the first up-or-out point coming at an officer’s review for promotion to Major 
(O4), at approximately the ten-year point.  Subsequent reviews or screening occurs for 
promotion to the higher grades (e.g., Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel).  This continuous 
screening for employment is based on annual performance reports, potential for 
advancement, and other criteria.  The screening is important since the organization must 
provide continuous firm-specific knowledge and training over time at great expense 
while ensuring a return on the investment.  If an officer fails to be promoted to the next 
higher grade, current statutes limit additional service and the officer must seek 
employment outside the military.   
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Screening allows for the productivity of the officer to be evaluated, which is 
otherwise difficult to measure.  This is especially true in the military, where officers serve 
in more managerial/leadership roles as they become more senior.  In this role they 
produce output indirectly by making others more productive, and the output of the Air 
Force is national defense, which is not readily amenable to measurement and valuation 
(Cymrot, February 1986).  In support of this screening, rank or position can be a valid 
measure of productivity according to Rosen (1992) and an Army organization study 
(Jacobs & Jacques, 1991).  This is a result of the responsibility associated with higher 
positions, which necessitates screening to ensure the long-term success of the 
organization.  This screening ensures that not all officers rise through the ranks.  These 
screens consider not only performance potential, but also motivation of an officer to 
realize that potential (Rosen, 1992).  Internal labor markets foster this motivation since 
“outsiders” or those junior are not considered for promotion consideration.   
Given that DoD is a closed labor market with a fixed pay scale dependent on only 
rank and time in service, the expected return of higher future earnings attributed to 
improved performance cannot be realized while on active duty.  Rather, higher 
probability of promotion during active service is one of the expected benefits for officers 
pursuing graduate education.  While the decision to participate in graduate education may 
be motivated in part to maximize post-service benefits (e.g., higher earnings and 
employment opportunities as a civilian), its may also be influenced by signaling, which 
can be viewed as an alternative screening device.   
4. Signaling and Bias 
Signaling theory is based on the idea that a worker conveys some meaningful 
information about his/her ability to an employer by his/her choice or level of education.  
Signaling asserts that organizations use formal schooling as a screening device to identify 
the most productive workers, since an employer may not possess complete information 
about a worker’s ability.  The theory asserts that the decision of an individual to obtain 
formal or advanced education is a signal of the true productivity of the individual.  It is 
based on the assumption that those who pursue education tend to have personal 
characteristics (e.g., commitment, discipline, drive) that are correlated with higher 
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productivity.  Using this theory, an individual with graduate education is signaling that 
he/she is more productive than an individual who does not posses one, when a choice is 
being made between otherwise identical resumes.  Equally, an employer is able to use 
this information as a means to screen out potentially less productive workers.   
With respect to the Air Force and its officers, signaling theory implies that 
officers who participate in graduate programs send a signal that identifies them as 
productive officers.  This concept is reinforced since signaling theory states that an 
employer will not be willing to fund advanced education unless it is less costly than using 
some other productivity measurement tool to identify the most productive workers.  
However, the use of signaling or screens can often be skewed by biases.   
Theses biases are based on self-selection or on ability differences.  Ability bias 
can lead to the returns on education to be overstated.  Overstating the influence of 
education occurs when the return is attributed in whole to the performance-enhancing 
effect of education versus taking into account other factors.  The role of ability bias is 
“people who are smarter and more dynamic are likely to obtain more schooling and might 
be more productive even if they did not complete more years of schooling” (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 2006).  Therefore, not taking into account the innate abilities of individuals 
who acquire graduate education overstates the performance benefit of advanced 
education.  
Self-selection bias can lead to the returns on education either being overstated or 
understated.  Self-selection bias is the tendency for individuals to choose or abstain from 
participating in activities, such as graduate education, based on some characteristic (e.g., 
attitude or motivation) that is not observed.  Further, an individual may exhibits certain 
behavior in response to organizational controls, be they perceived or real.  Those who are 
academically talented or enjoy academia for example, are more likely to self-select into 
graduate programs, as compared to those who are “academically challenged” or enjoy 
other pursuits, whom would be less likely to participate.  Thus, depending on one’s 
aptitude and attitude towards graduate education, self-selection bias can cause the returns 
attributed to graduate education to be inaccurate.   
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Self-selection bias plays an even greater role within an internal labor market.  It 
has been characterized as a pricing scheme used by a firm to ensure only qualified 
individuals apply for positions (Salop & Salop, 1976).  Self-selection plays an important 
role in the internal labor market concerning costs and benefits.  In this respect, officers 
who expect future returns to equal or exceed current costs will choose to stay in the 
military whereas those who do not expect greater returns will choose to seek employment 
elsewhere.  Similarly, those who choose to pursue graduate education are accepting some 
opportunity cost and the perceived effects on their career.   
Given these considerations, it is easy to see the difficulty in conducting research 
on the returns to graduate education.  Yet research is essential in providing insight for 
organizations to assist with evaluating performance and developing retention and 
promotion policies.  While there is no perfectly accurate method for doing so, research 
into this area is an important means to explain the relationship between performance and 
education.     
B. RELEVANT PAST STUDIES 
1. Studies by Wise (1975) 
In 1975, David Wise, conducted two studies that were published in the American 
Economic Review and Econometrica, respectively, to investigate some of the concerns 
with human capital theory.  In his initial study, “Academic Achievement and Job 
Performance,” Wise addressed whether academic achievement was related to job 
performance and whether this relationship was due to personal characteristics or other 
cognitive skills gained in school.  His study made use of an ordinary least squares model 
that used salary as a dependent variable with explanatory variables including level of 
education, employment experience, and other personal characteristics.  This approach 
allowed him to use salary as a proxy for productivity.  The results indicated that 
nonacademic attributes, such as initiative and leadership, were as important as academic 
abilities in determining job performance.  Employees with graduate degrees and who 
were at the top 5% of their class received the highest salary increases in the model.  He 
found that graduate education was correlated with higher job performance in accordance 
with human capital theory.  
16
In his second study, “Personal Attributes, Job Performance, and Probability of 
Promotion,” Wise addressed the same questions as in his previous study with the same 
data and explanatory variables, but unlike his first study, he utilized a maximum 
likelihood technique to estimate the relation between promotion and education.  He 
hypothesized that a person’s rate of promotion might be a more direct measure of job 
performance than the rate of salary increase given the problem that salaries are assigned 
to positions rather than to individual employees, similar to the DoD military and civilian 
pay systems.  Therefore, salary may not be an accurate measure of an employee’s 
performance.  Moreover, salaries are usually adjusted based on length of service versus 
performance, and thus employees often receive annual raises despite not actually being 
promoted.  This practice is common in both government and many large, private 
organizations.  Ironically, Wise’s results were consistent with his previous study.  In his 
study, a graduate degree had a greater effect, on the promotion probability than it had on 
salary.  Specifically, the probability of promotion for master’s degree holders was 
approximately 43.2 percent, assuming other variables were at their means.  Additionally, 
nonacademic characteristics remained as important as the effect of academic achievement 
on job performance. 
2. Studies by Medoff and Abraham (1980/1981) 
Contradicting studies conducted by Wise was research by James Medoff and 
Katharine Abraham that was published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1980.  
In their article, “Experience, Performance, and Earnings” the researchers obtained some 
results that appeared to contradict previous human capital theory research.  The focus of 
their research was on whether additional earnings resulting from additional human capital 
investment could be explained by higher or increased work productivity.  While the data 
were limited to only white males, it included information on education, length of 
employment, work location, current job grade, date of entry into current job grade, and 
salary information.  The data also included measures of the employee’s performance as 
well as an assessment of his/her potential for advancement based on a committee 
evaluation rather than on an evaluation by a single supervisor.     
17
The authors estimated a semi-log salary in their first model, excluding grade 
information, and the results were consistent with human capital theory.  Employees 
possessing a high school diploma or less received 13-23 percent lower earnings as 
compared to college graduates.  Whereas those individuals possessing a master’s degree 
or doctorate increased their earnings 10 percent and 21 percent, respectively.  Prior 
experience and years with the organization were also significant factors in positively 
influencing salary. 
In their second model, grade levels were included to determine wage differences 
within in each grade.  In these models, the coefficients of education dropped 
significantly.  The effect of a master’s degree on salary declined from 10 percent to just 2 
percent.  This indicated that those possessing a master’s degree were assigned to jobs 
with higher grades.  Corresponding to this change, prior experience, and years with the 
organization also lost their influence on salary.  The authors ran one additional iteration 
with both performance and grade criteria included and the results derived were similar to 
the second model.  This implied that performance ratings could not explain the effect of 
explanatory variables such as experience and education.   
The same team published another study in 1981 in The Journal of Human 
Resources, “Are Those Paid More Really More Productive: The Case of Experience,” 
which analyzed the relationship between experience and job performance using cross-
sectional longitudinal data that used performance ratings as an indicator of performance.  
The team wanted to explore whether better earnings signified that more experienced 
employees were more productive than their less experienced co-workers.  The team used 
the same data set from their initial study and estimated a semi-log salary model.  The 
results were similar to their first study; however of particular note was that when dummy 
variables were inserted to represent performance within each grade, the coefficients did 
not converge towards zero.  This result indicated that a person who received higher 
earnings based on his/her performance appraisals, performed no better than less senior 
co-workers in the same grade.  This was unusual in that it contradicted normal human 




comparable jobs there is no association between additional human capital and 
performance.  However, the study does capture the dynamics associated with an internal 
labor market where an employee may be paid more than their marginal value.   
3. Study by Cymrot (1986) 
In research for the Center for Naval Analysis, Donald Cymrot specifically 
examined human capital theory for Navy officers in his study “Graduate Education and 
the Promotion of Officers.”  The principle purpose of the study was to examine the 
effects of fully funded graduate education on the promotion of Navy officers since 
promotion can be an indicator of productivity.  He utilized a cross sectional database 
constructed from the 1985 Officer Master File.  All officers from the ranks of O4 through 
O7 were examined.  The study used a logistic regression (LOGIT) model with promotion 
as a proxy for individual performance to examine the impact of graduate education along 
with other officer demographics (e.g., age, sex, time in service, etc.).  
Results of the study showed that graduate education is statistically significant in 
explaining promotion to the ranks of O4, O5, and O6, but not to O7.  Further, results 
indicated that officers who complete an advanced degree are more likely to be promoted 
as compared to those who do not.  Specifically, the probability of promotion to O4 and 
O5 increased by 26 percent and 10.5 percent, respectively.  The results of the study also 
assert that annual performance evaluations, promotion, and retention are all valid 
productivity indicators.   
One weakness of this particular study, however, was the fact that the officers 
analyzed were a subset of the officer cohort since they had been selected for in-residence 
education, thus creating bias.  While the author recognized that selection for fully funded 
graduate education is contingent upon potential (e.g., promotability) and may creates 
bias, the study did not attempt to correct for it.  As a result of this selection bias, the 
impact of graduate education may be overstated.  Additionally, self-selection bias is a 
concern since individuals may self-select into in-residence education programs as a 
means to improve promotion probability. 
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4. Study by Jordan (1991) 
In a master’s thesis by Susan Jordan at the Naval Postgraduate School, the author 
analyzed the effects of graduate education on the performance and retention of U.S. Navy 
General Unrestricted Line (GURL) Officers.  Specifically, the author was interested in 
determining the how graduate degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School and other 
institutions affected the probability of promotion to Lieutenant Commander (O4) and 
Commander (O5), and on retention to the same ranks.  At that time, GURL officers were 
predominately women and they performed staff functions. 
Data were derived from DMDC that combined Officer Promotion History Data 
Files and the Officer Master Record Files.  Data elements included demographic, 
educational, experience, and selection board data on all officers, both active and reserve, 
in paygrades 0-2 (LTJG) through 0-7 (RADM) from 1981 through 1990.  To analyze the 
effects for the two study areas, logistic regression models were used to examine the 
probability of voluntarily staying in the U.S. Navy and being promoted or voluntarily 
leaving the Navy.     
Results indicated that graduate education had a positive impact on the probability 
of promotion to Lieutenant Commander, with those attending the Naval Postgraduate 
School, an in-residence program, showing a stronger effect than other educational 
institutions.  This in part could be attributed to screening on the part of the Navy for 
future potential along with potential careerists signaling their willingness to attend 
graduate school in-residence with the expectation of future returns.  No significant effect 
was noted for promotion to Commander.  Graduate education was found to have a 
significant impact on retention prior to the Lieutenant Commander selection point but the 
results for retention to the Commander selection level were insignificant.  In all samples, 
both an NPS degree and a degree from other institutions significantly decreased the 
probability of leaving the Navy.  The author hypothesizes that this could be in large part 
explained by the additional service obligation incurred.  While the results of this thesis 
are consistent with human capital theory, of concern was the small size of the population 
studied along with the limited occupations surveyed, which limit the applicability of the 
results.  
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5. Study by Alley, et al. (1995) 
In 1995, a group of Air Command and Staff College students and faculty were 
tasked with investigating how to best assure off-duty education opportunities for Air 
Force personnel.  The team examined the broad facets of off-duty, voluntary education 
programs, including value to the Air Force and the individual, cost versus return on 
investment, and relationship to career progression.  Specific focus was placed on 
understanding the importance of tuition assistance with respect to recruitment, retention, 
and individual motivation. 
The study made use of a qualitative methodology that was comprised of 
reviewing job advertisements and educational surveys to gain a greater understanding of 
required and perceived educational needs for both officer and enlisted personnel.  For 
purposes of this review, the focus will be on the results obtained for the officer corps. 
Content analysis was the research technique employed to review job 
advertisements to make inferences about characteristics required to fill vacancies based 
on key words or phrases.  The areas reviewed were communication (briefing and 
writing), leadership (functions of management and supervising), and degree 
desired/mandatory to meet the prerequisites of the job.  Additionally, researchers created 
a final category, “Advanced Management-Related Degree” to record the researcher’s 
assessment that an advanced degree would be useful for the described job.  A 
management-related advanced degree was selected because historically that tended to be 
the most popular type of degree conferred upon military officers.  To make this 
assessment objective, researchers excluded any jobs that advertised that an advanced 
degree was desired or mandatory.  Secondly, the categories of communication and 
leadership were used as indicators of a need for particular skills that might be enhanced 
by an advanced degree.  Using these data, a weighted scoring system was employed to 
determine whether an advanced management degree was desirable to meet job 
requirements.  Briefing and writing outcomes were assigned a score of 1 each, if required 
for the job, since the outcomes were narrow.  On the other hand, the functions of 
management and supervising being broader and more significant skills were assigned a 
score of 2 each, if required.  Using this information, 3,506 job advertisements were 
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reviewed and if a job advertisement received an overall score of 3 or better, it was 
recommended that it be filled by someone possessing an advanced degree in a 
management related discipline.   
The tuition assistance (TA) and off-duty education survey was developed to 
establish an opinion-oriented baseline on TA and generic education programs.  The 
survey was administered to 2,290 officers and enlisted personnel.  It requested personal 
background (e.g., highest educational level attained, current grade, etc.), knowledge of 
TA (e.g., are you familiar with TA, have you used TA, etc.) and their opinion on the 
education program (e.g., effects of educational programs on joining and staying in 
military, should degrees be major factors in promotion, etc.) 
Results of the content analysis indicate that one is more likely to come across jobs 
that either express or imply that an advanced degree is desirable among field grade 
officers (O4 and above) as compared to company grade officers (O3 and below).  In 
addition, the promotion statistics suggest that officers currently tend to complete their 
advanced degree around the time they make the rank of Major (O4).  The survey results 
indicate that there is a strong perception among officers that having an advanced degree 
is a major factor in officer promotions.  “To continue this train of logic, field grade level 
is around the time that officers are expected to become less a specialist and more a 
generalist” (Alley et al., 1995). 
While this study did not provide any statistical evidence that advanced education 
improves productivity as measured by promotion or retention, it did provide evidence 
that a perception exists that education is a consideration in the promotion process.  While 
education may not be directly correlated to promotion, results indicated that education is 
an avenue to filling higher-level jobs, which allow individuals to be more competitive for 
promotions.  Further, the study highlighted that personnel believe that their human capital 
can be improved through education, even though this may be difficult to quantify, and 




6. Study by Bowman and Mehay (1999)  
In a similar study to the 1986 research by Cymrot, Bowman and Mehay analyzed 
the effect of a master’s degree on the probability of promotion to O4 for naval officers.  
Differing from the Cymrot study, the authors wanted to address concerns about bias, 
either those associated with self-selection or by the Navy’s selection process.  In order to 
do so, the authors used a unique database consisting of 4,471 line and staff officers in the 
Navy’s Promotion History File between 1985 and 1990, which was augmented with 
fitness reports (annual performance reports) prior to the promotion to O4.  The data was 
then grouped into explanatory variables, based on their characteristics, into the following 
groups:  cognitive traits (GPA, undergraduate degree, graduate degree, etc.); affective 
traits (accession source); and demographic traits (age, race, sex, etc.). 
Using sequential modeling that utilized probit techniques, four models were 
developed to estimate the effects of graduate education on promotion.  In each modeling 
step, the authors attempt to isolate the effect of graduate education on promotion and to 
control for variables that may influence the promotion process.  In the first model, only 
graduate education is examined and in the subsequent models, demographic traits, 
cognitive traits and, affective traits are added.   
Initial results indicated that line and staff officers with a master’s degree were 
promoted at rates of ten and fourteen percent greater than officers not possessing degrees 
respectively.  However, the educational impact is reduced as the different traits are added 
that account for unobserved factors that relate to both self-selection and competitiveness 
for promotion.  This reduction in biases is accomplished using a bivariate probit model.  
As a result, the marginal effects of graduate education on the probability of promotion 
decreases by approximately 40 and 50 percent for line and staff officers, respectively.   
In the same study, Bowman and Mehay also analyzed the effect of in-residence 
(fully funded) graduate programs to examine whether there was any differences between 
firm specific training, in-residence programs, and general training programs, and their 
associated impact on promotion.  This was accomplished by comparing individuals who 
possess a master’s degree, either in residence or through other means, with those who did 
not possess one.  The results revealed that the return to in-residence graduate education 
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for line officers was nearly double as compared to those just possessing a master’s degree 
from a non-residence program.  Similarly, for staff officers, the return was 20 percent 
higher.  Results are shown below in Tables 2 and 3.  The tables also highlight the 
presence of selection bias by the Navy for in-residence programs when compared to other 
master’s programs (e.g., off-duty)  When the single-stage model controlled for 
performance and ability, the return to the Navy funded Master’s for line officers 
decreased by one-half, whereas it only dropped about one-third for any other master’s 
degree.  Staff officers had comparable results with the return to any master’s degree 
reduced by two-thirds and the return to an in-residence master’s degree reduced three-
quarters.   
 
Table 2.    Coefficient of any master’s degree in single stage and bivariate probit 
models 
 
 1. No Controls for 
abilility/performance 






















Source: Bowman and Mehay, “Graduate Education and employee performance: evidence from military 
personnel” 
a – Standard errors in parentheses. 
b – Marginal effects in brackets. 
 
Table 3. Coefficient of fully funded master’s degree and bivariate probit models 
 
 1. No Controls for 
ability/performance 






















Source: Bowman and Mehay, “Graduate Education and employee performance: evidence from military 
personnel” 
a – Standard errors in parentheses. 
b – Marginal effects in brackets. 
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From these results, the authors concluded that both firm-specific and general 
types of investments provided a positive return to officers in the Navy, and overall, 
officers possessing a master’s degree, regardless of source, were more likely to be 
promoted to O4.   
The Bowman and Mehay study takes into account both observable and 
unobservable factors that may influence promotion along with addressing any selection 
bias that may exist.  Further, the research captures the dynamics associated with an 
internal labor market and supports the positive relationships between human capital 
investment and performance.  One area of concern with the research was possible 
differences between occupations that could not be captured by the grouping methodology 
used and the question of whether returns would be similar when modeled for higher 
grades.   
7. Study by Kabalar (2003)  
In a Naval Postgraduate School master’s thesis, Hakan Kabalar analyzed the 
effect of graduate education on promotion to Lieutenant Colonel (O5) in the U.S. Army.  
The author used data from fiscal years 1981 to 2001 obtained from DMDC as cohort data 
sets that contained both demographic, professional, and promotion variables.  
Demographic variables used consisted of gender, race, age, marital status and number of 
dependents.  Professional factors used were education, commissioning source, DOD 
primary occupation code and prior enlisted experience.  Combining the nine predictor 
and one response variable, promotion to O5, Kabalar examined how personnel who 
entered military service in 1981, 1982, 1983 performed using logistic regression and 
classification tree models.   
Using these models, he explored the effect of each predictor variable on 
promotion to O5.  The results indicated that officers with graduate education have higher 
promotion probabilities.  The estimated odds ratio for graduate education was within a 
range of 1.79 to 2.25 suggesting that the promotion odds ratio among officers with 
graduate degrees is 1.79-2.25 times the same ratio for officers without graduate degrees.  
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Another effect discovered was that Academy or ROTC/Scholarship graduates 
have higher promotion probabilities compared to officers from other commission sources 
highlighting that early screening by the Army may be occurring prior to commissioning 
and that career-minded individuals may self-select to attend these institutions.  This 
corresponds with previous studies that highlighted the findings that commissioning 
source plays a role in promotion outcomes and therefore must be considered when 
examining the effects of graduate education.  Of further interest were the variables for 
DOD primary occupation code (e.g., civilian equivalent for MOS/AFSC), which were 
found not to be statistically significant.  This suggests that the Army does not 
differentiate between occupations in the promotion process, all other factors being equal.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed labor economics theory and prior studies that are relevant 
to this thesis.  In particular, the methodologies used by Wise, Jordan, and Kabalar provide 
a framework for this thesis.  The other studies provide insight into the dynamics of 
internal labor markets and considerations that should be included when examining the 
effects of graduate education.   
While there have been numerous studies conducted to determine the effect of 
graduate education on civilian organizations and within the Department of the Navy, 
there have not been many similar studies for the Department of the Air Force that focus 
solely on graduate education.  Rather, the Air Force has focused on the benefits of 
Professional Military Education, especially in looking at promotion rates.  However, 
these studies provide a basis for examining the effects of graduate education on Air Force 
officers since the promotion policies, personnel systems, and hierarchical system are 
common within DoD and similar to large, private organizations.   
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III. AIR FORCE OFFICER SYSTEM 
This chapter discusses in general the officer development of Line of the Air Force 
Officers (LAF) including classification, evaluation, and promotion through the rank of 
Major.  It concludes with a review of the graduate education system available to Air 
Force officers.  While the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1981 
established a common officer management system for DoD that created a uniform 
concept regarding how officers should be accessed, trained, and promoted, all the 
services interject their own unique features into the process of developing officers.  This 
development includes training, education, and assignments that prepare an officer for 
their primary duty but also combines skills and experiences so they understand the 
broader Air Force and DoD perspectives.    
Commissioning into the officer corps is done primarily through the Air Force 
Academy (AFA), Reserve Officer’s Training Corp (ROTC), or through Officer Training 
School (OTS).  However, other non-traditional means exist including direct appointments 
or through the National Guard Academy of Military Science.  Historically, the largest 
portion of officer accessions has come from ROTC followed by the AFA and OTS.  
Roughly, 20 percent of the officers are commissioned through the Air Force Academy, 
43 percent through Reserve Officer Training Corps, 21 percent through Officer Training 
School, with the remaining 16 percent from other sources.  Upon accession, a career 
progression in the Air Force may follow varying paths depending upon occupation and 
other factors; however, professional development, evaluation, and performance are 
consistent regardless of occupation. 
A. AIR FORCE OFFICER CLASSIFICATION  
All Air Force officers are classified by their occupation in order to identify 
individuals possessing the skills needed to fill Air Force requirements.  This classification 
is accomplished using Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) along with prefixes, suffixes, 
and other identifiers.  The flexibility of the system allows identification of highly skilled 
specialists as well as broad generalists.  This system of classification is based on Air 
Force Specialties (AFS), in which positions are grouped based on similar functions and 
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requirements for knowledge, training, experience, etc.  These AFSs are further combined 
into broader and more general functional categories called career fields.  This functional 
grouping provides a classification and utilization system that remains stable regardless of 
changes in organizational structure and provides a framework to access, train, and 
develop specialized and broadly experienced personnel.  Further, it provides a framework 
for upgrading and retaining officers for career progression. 
Each AFS is identified by an AFSC and has a specialty title and an occupational 
description contained in AFMAN 36-2105.  This results in every officer having an 
assigned Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC).  In order for an officer to be awarded most 
AFSCs, mandatory qualifications must be met, and other qualifications may be required 
for upgrade or retention of the AFSC.  Normally, officers will remain within their 
particular AFS during the duration of their career; however, they may choose or be 
selected to work outside their AFSC or career field.  This is generally done for career 
broadening or to develop a wider range of knowledge required for later in their career.  
While they may assume a different duty AFS, their primary AFS will not change unless 
they are re-designated into a new AFS.  All Air Force officers are considered line officers 
unless they are part of a professional or medical occupation.  A summary of the line 
AFSs is listed in Table 4 below, which displays how the AFSCs are grouped by career 
field according to AFMAN 36-2105.  These groupings fall into six major areas: 1) 
operations; 2) logistics; 3) support; 4) acquisition and financial management; 5) special 
investigations; and 6) special duty/reporting identifiers.  Of note is that those officers 
holding a special duty/reporting identifier are normally from another AFS and assume 
that AFS for the duration of the assignment, keeping their primary AFS as mentioned 


























Source: AFMAN 26-2105, Officer Classification 
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B. AIR FORCE OFFICER PROGRESSION 
While it would be difficult to summarize how each officer should progress during 
his or her career given the unique requirements of each AFSC, some generalizations 
about career progression are universal and provide a baseline for understanding how 
officers are developed.  In short, Air Force officers are developed through leadership 
opportunities, education and training, and experience over their assignments to perform 
in their specialty while at the same time “growing” them as future leaders.  This 
“growing” process is in large part based on officers’ first gaining proficiency in their 
specialty, then in their career field, and then finally as an aerospace specialist.  This 
development process is based on each career field’s skill requirements along with the 
member’s background, aptitude, and desires; however, all officers receive the same 
developmental education, such as through PME.   
Accessions into a particular career-field primarily occur at the O1 level, with a 
small number of lateral accessions occurring later through transfers of officers from other 
career fields.  Most newly commissioned officers (O1) are assigned to formal training 
before their initial duty assignments.  The length of formal training will vary according to 
the career field.  For the first several assignments, the goal is to build technical 
competence within the chosen career field, which might include leadership assignments 
along with completion of basic developmental education, which include the Air & Space 
Basic Course and Squadron Officers School, and any career-field-specific training 
requirements.  Opportunities may be available at this time for special duty, which might 
include instructor duty or a tour as a foreign affairs officer.  Further, if the officer is in a 
career field with advanced academic degree requirements, he/she may be selected to earn 
an advanced degree.  Assignments usually include several years at the base-level or an 
equivalent organization and a staff tour at a headquarters and may include several 
deployments.  This time span will usually encompass the grades of O1 through O3 or 
roughly ten years. 
As an O4, an officer will have developed proficiency in his or her core career 
field and will begin to broaden their knowledge base through other staff tours that might 
include tours at the Pentagon or joint duty assignments along with deployments.  Some 
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officers at this time may laterally transfer into new career fields or complete special duty 
tours to broaden their knowledge of Air Force operations.  At this point, officers will 
begin assuming more senior leadership positions at either staff or wing-level 
organizations commensurate with their grade and experience.  Intermediate 
developmental education during this time might include Air Command and Staff College, 
an assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School or the Air Force Institute of Technology, 
or other PME schools.  Assignments might also include tours as squadron commanders or 
directors of operations.  This period encompasses roughly five years and several 
assignments may occur during this time.   
To provide an overview of how different career fields progress, Figure 1 below, 
illustrates typical career field dynamics for two AFSs, one in operations, the other in 
support.  Of particular note, the figure illustrates how each career area has differing 
assignment possibilities along with opportunities to complete in-residence graduate 
education programs, such as AAD, the Air Force Intern Program (AFIP), along with 
PME.  Further, given operational and training requirements, some career fields may 
experience more limited opportunities at certain grades to attain in-residence education as 
compared to officers in other areas, especially concerning advanced academic degree 
requirements.   
For example, in the case of the security forces officer, the pyramid below 
illustrates that during the first several years, a member will serve as a flight commander 
or officer-in-charge.  During this time period, they will attend formal AFS training such 
as the ground defense course along with PME commensurate with their grade.  As 
Captains, they will have the opportunity to serve in staff positions and may attend 
additional AFS specific training such as at the FBI Academy.  However, there is limited 
opportunity to complete in-residence education unless they are selected for AFIP.  While 
an officer can complete an advanced degree off-duty, for the majority of officers the first 
real opportunity would be as Majors, where more chances are provided, such as through 
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C. AIR FORCE EVALUATION AND PROMOTION 
The Air Force officer evaluation and promotion program’s purpose is to select 
enough officers of the desired quality and grades to carry out the mission.  To accomplish 
this end, the Air Force promotes officers in sufficient numbers as vacancies occur, 
maintaining the strength of the Air Force in each grade, and providing reasonable 
progression to retain a qualified officer corps. 
The Air Force screens officers for promotion based on their potential to 
successfully serve in the next higher grade and in positions of greater responsibility.  The 
criterion the Air Force uses to evaluate each officer’s relative potential is known as the 
“whole-person” concept per AFPAM 36-2506.  This “whole-person” concept includes 
such factors as job performance, breadth and depth of experience, academic and 
professional military education along with specific achievements that include awards and 
decorations.  Industry uses similar screening factors to ensure jobs are filled by people 
who will be productive in positions along with other considerations such as job-match.  
Officers are evaluated on an annual basis, normally, to provide an accurate 
appraisal of performance   Supervisors document each officer’s performance and impact 
on the unit’s mission on an Officer Performance Report (OPR).  OPRs, in conjunction 
with education and training reports, letters of evaluation, and other “whole person” 
criteria covering the officer’s entire career, are then used to write a Promotion 
Recommendation Form (PRF) by the officer’s senior rater to determine promotion 
potential. 
There are three elements to the officer promotion process: eligibility; selection; 
and promotion.  Laws, regulations, and administrative procedures control each.  These 
are interrelated and driven by: Authorized strength (the number of officers in a particular 
category specified for a grade or combination of grades); the promotion flow point (the 
number of years of commissioned service at which most officers would be promoted to 
the next higher grade); and the promotion percentage (the number of officers in the 
promotion zone to be selected.).  These factors are interrelated and cannot be separated 
from each other; a change in one will force a change in the others.  
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The typical promotion for LAF officers is portrayed below in Table 5; however, 
as already explained, it may vary from year to year.  However, this chart provides a good 
estimate on when promotions occur.  The promotion system is “blind” to AFS 
requirements and focuses, rather, on selecting those “best qualified” regardless of 
occupational specialty.   
There are three promotion zones for officers in the same grade who are eligible 
for promotion consideration.  They are the following: Above-the-Promotion Zone (APZ), 
Below-the-Promotion Zone (BPZ), and In-the-Promotion Zone.  APZ indicates the 
officer’s “late” consideration for promotion.  These officers have previously failed IPZ 
selection to the next grade and are senior to officers being considered IPZ.  BPZ indicates 
the officer’s “early” consideration for promotion.  Officers are eligible BPZ at the two 
boards immediately preceding the board in which they are considered IPZ.  BPZ applies 
to O5s and above.  Officers eligible for BPZ are always junior to officers being 
considered IPZ.  IPZ indicates the officer’s “on-time” consideration for promotion to the 
next grade based on his or her current date of rank.  The opportunity for promotion is 
highest when officers are IPZ.  It should be noted that officers in the grade of O4 or O5 
who are not selected for promotion may remain on active duty until they have reached 20 
years of commissioned service.   
 
Table 5. Officer Promotion Structure 
 
Rank Time in Service Time in Grade Process 
02 2 Years 2 Years Fully Qualified 
03 4 Years 2 Years Best Qualified-Selection Board 
04 9-11 Years 3 Years Best Qualified-Selection Board 
05 15-17 Years 3 Years Best Qualified-Selection Board 
06 21-23 Years 3 Years Best Qualified-Selection Board 
Source: AFPAM 36-2506, You and Your Promotions – The Air Force Officer 
Promotion Program, and DoDI 1320.13, COPRs and Procedures 
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The PRF is then used by a promotion selection board to determine which officers 
should be selected for the next grade based on their future leadership potential as 
evaluated by the board.  Officers determined to have the leadership potential required for 
the next rank are promoted.  Officers meeting a promotion board will have a PRF written 
by their senior rater who can make three recommendations for promotion; 1) “Definitely 
Promote” (DP), “Promote” (P), or “Do Not Promote This Board” (DNP).  DNPs are 
usually reserved for officers under circumstances in which unfavorable information may 
exist.  While a senior rater may give an unlimited number of Ps and DNPs, DPs are based 
on an eligible number of officers.  Since the numbers of officers that a board can select 
for promotion are greater than the number of DP recommendations, and since a “DP” is 
not a guarantee of promotion, each board will select for promotion some officers who 
receive a “Promote” recommendation.   
Two of the most significant factors for promotion are OPRs and the level of 
responsibility in their current and past assignments.  However, level of education also 
plays a role, especially in promotion to grades above O3.  This includes PME as well as 
attainment of an advanced degree.  While all officers should complete PME 
commensurate with their grade, those possessing an advanced degree may have a distinct 
advantage, which is why starting in 2003, academic information was masked for selection 
boards for the grades of O3 and O4.  However, this information is not masked for senior 
raters, who must recommend who should be promoted to the next higher grade.  
Therefore, an educational bias may exist where having an advanced degree may 
differentiate one officer from an equally qualified peer.  It should be emphasized that 
advanced degrees are not masked for the grade of O5, which is a reason many 
“careerists” may pursue an advanced degree earlier in their careers. 
D. AIR FORCE GRADUATE EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES 
The Air Force offers numerous opportunities for officers to obtain an advanced 
degree either in-residence or through off-duty education programs.  The problem faced 
by some officers is fitting graduate education into an already busy career.  While any 
officer can complete a degree, duties permitting, through off-duty education programs 
using tuition assistance or like programs, in-residence programs are more career-field and 
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grade-dependent and filled through competitive boards.  As a result, many officers may 
complete off-duty education at the beginning of their careers, time permitting, and then 
pursue in-residence programs as they become more senior in rank. 
In-residence programs, which are fully funded, can be broken down into the two 
broad categories of AAD and developmental education.  The focus of AAD is to obtain a 
degree directly related to the primary utilization area of an officer and to enhance an 
officer’s professional qualifications.  Therefore, this type of education would be 
considered firm-specific and usually focuses on an officer’s AFS.  There are over 4,000 
advanced academic degree (AAD) positions within the Air Force, which are normally 
completed either at AFIT, NPS, or through civilian institutions.  The largest population of 
officers who obtain AAD degrees are company grade officers mainly from the acquisition 
and financial community, however opportunities exist for other career fields and grades. 
Conversely, the focus of developmental education programs is generally an 
advanced degree that tends to enhance job performance and provides breadth 
development versus meeting specific qualifications.  Therefore, developmental education 
tends to be more general in nature rather than firm-specific.  Programs that fall under this 
category include: attendance at one of the intermediate PME schools, where often an 
advanced degree can be earned with additional coursework; the Air Force Intern Program 
where officers split time working in the Pentagon and attending classes; fellowship 
programs; or attendance at NPS or AFIT as a field grade officer.  Field grade officers 
comprise the largest population of officers who attend developmental educational 
programs in which an advanced degree is completed; however, some opportunities are 
available for O3s, normally with at least six years of commissioned service.   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has described in general terms how Air Force officers are classified, 
evaluated, and promoted and has provided information about graduate education 
opportunities.  The main purpose of this chapter is to establish how graduate education is 
deliberately embedded into officer professional development, and to explain that there are 
different opportunities throughout an officer’s career to complete an advanced degree 
either in-residence or off-duty, dependent upon career field and other decision criteria.  
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Further, it highlights the fact that, although performance is the major criterion for 
promotion, and the Air Force focuses on promoting the “best qualified”, advanced 
education may also be a factor, especially when personnel are perceived as otherwise 
equal.  Similarly, graduate education can be used by officers as a signaling mechanism to 
indicate not only how they may have improved their productivity but also their desire to 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the data set and the methodology that guides the 
specification of the models.  It also provides descriptive statistics for each data set used to 
estimate the various performance models.   
A. DATA 
The data sets used in this study are developed from the Active Duty Military 
Officer File for the Air Force maintained at DMDC in Monterey, CA.  The file tracks 
active duty officers through their military careers.  Specifically, the file is constructed for 
each fiscal year’s accessions, using three types of information per individual: first 
accession, the individual’s most recent information, and the first loss information.  
Personal data elements include a unique ID, education level, marital status, number of 
dependents, age, and race.  Military data elements include pay grade, source of 
commission, Air Force Specialty Code, DoD Occupation Code, current months in grade, 
and date of current rank.  The file constructed for this study contains observations of Air 
Force officers who were on active duty between 1992 through 2006 in the grades of O2 
through O4.  It was pre-determined to use only observations for officers commissioned 
after 1992 to minimize any force structure changes associated with the post-Cold War 
drawdown while still capturing several accession cycles whose members that would be 
retained through the rank of Major.   
The original raw data file included 55,542 observations and 44 data elements 
before being converted into a SAS (Statistical Application Software) file for the statistical 
analysis.  The data were then limited to just Line of the Air Force (LAF) officers 
(excludes medical, legal, and chaplain personnel) who attained at least a baccalaureate 
degree.  Additionally, while it is possible to achieve a commission without a 
baccalaureate degree, it is unusual in the Air Force and so officers with less than a 
baccalaureate degree were excluded from the study.   
Some observations were deleted due to missing or unknown information for the 
following data elements:  begin paygrade, current paygrade, current AFSC, current 
education level, gender, current marital status, current dependents, current age, current 
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months in grade, or begin years of service.  Further, the data were restricted to officers 
who had not separated in grades below O3 or who were currently not an O3 or O4.  This 
resulted in 28,505 observations available for modeling using the data elements listed in 
Table 6 below. 
 




Begin Years of Service 
Current Age 
Current Marital 
Current Education Level 
Current Dependent Count 
Current Source of Entry Code 
Current Paygrade 
Current Months in Grade 
Current AFSC 
Current DOD Occupation Code 
Current Date Current Rank 
Separation Paygrade 
Separation Transaction Code 
Interservice Separation Code 
Source: DMDC 
Given that the objective of this study is to model the effects of graduate education 
on retention and promotion behavior, the data were categorized into the two groups, 
Captains and Majors, for retention and promotion analysis.  These two ranks were 
selected because they represent major decision points in an officer’s career.  Further, 
from an Air Force perspective, these two ranks represent “middle management” and are 
considered the backbone of the officer corps.  To examine retention behavior, two models 
were constructed, one for each rank.  Only one model was estimated to explain  
promotion.  This model addressed promotion to the rank of Major, since promotion to the 
rank of Captain is almost 100 percent. 
A single database was constructed to use in determining the probability of staying 
in the Air Force and the probability of being promoted.  Observations were first identified 
as those voluntarily separating (“leavers”) and those selecting to stay (“stayers”).  
“Stayers” include those who voluntarily stay in the Air Force beyond their initial 
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commitment and “leavers” include those who voluntarily leave after completing their 
initial commitment.  The purpose of separating involuntary leavers from voluntary 
leavers is to model voluntary retention and promotion behavior more accurately.  
Individuals who leave due to poor health, retirement, who die, or for whom the reason for 
separation was unknown were excluded from the study (533 observations).  Individuals 
who were involuntary separated for discipline problems were also excluded from the 
study (466 observations).  For the promotion model, the data used for analysis were the 
“stayers” identified from the retention model who were eligible for promotion to major, 
6,581 observations.  
As a result, a total of 27,506 observations remained for analysis.  The number of 
voluntary leavers and stayers for the grades being studied are provided in Table 7 below. 
 




Leavers Stayers Total 
Captain (O3) 3,802 16,923 20,725 
Major (O4) 233 6,548 6,781 
Total Observations 4,035 23,471 27,971 
Source:  Author 
B.  PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
a. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable used for the retention model is constructed using 
the InterService Separation Codes provided by DMDC, which show if an officer 
separated, separation rank, and the rationale for the loss.  The dependent variable for 
retention is based on these codes.  A voluntary separation or release from the Air Force is 
categorized as STAY = 0, otherwise STAY = 1.  The separation codes for leavers, reason 
for separation, and number of observations are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8.    Voluntary Separation Codes for Leavers 
 
DMDC Code Description Frequency Percentage (%) 
2001 Expiration of term of 
service 
3,220 79.80 
2002 Voluntary release, to attend 
school or to teach 
6 0.15 
2003 Voluntary release, in the 
national interest 
0 0 
2005 Voluntary release, other, 
including VSI and SSB 
809 20.05 
Total 4,035 100 
Note:  These codes can be found in DMDC Active Duty Military Edit File  
Source: Author 
 
The dependent variable used for the promotion model is initially based on 
the data from the retention model where STAY = 1 and then promotion outcomes were 
then constructed using InterService Separation Codes provided by DMDC, which 
indicated if an officer was separated for failure of selection for promotion.  If the there 
was no Interservice Separation Code, then promotion was determined by comparing the 
beginning rank information with the individual’s most recent rank to determine if they 
were promoted to O4, and the dependent variable is coded as PROMOTE =1.  
Conversely, if there was an Interservice Separation Code indicating that an officer failed 
to be promoted, then the dependent variable is coded as PROMOTE = 0.   
b. Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables include officers’ personal characteristics and 
professional backgrounds.  They are grouped into the following categories: 
Demographics, Professional, and Education.  Demographics consist of gender, race, age, 
marital status, and number of dependents.  Professional factors were commission source, 
current months in grade, prior enlisted experience, and AFSC career group.  Education 




2. Data Description for Stayers and Leavers 
Table 9 provides statistics about the two ranks being studied for the retention 
model.  It provides an overview of the characteristics of LAF officers in the grades of O3 
and O4.  These  data are used to provide an understanding of the dynamics of the samples 
and help formulate hypotheses about the effects of the explanatory variables on LAF 
retention at the two grades of O3 and O4.  
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of LAF Officers  
(percent or mean) 
 




Retention%    
Stay 81.66 96.56 
Gender%   
Male 83.01 89.88 
Female 16.99 10.12 
Race%   
White 80.75 85.84 
Black 6.91 5.50 
Other Race 12.34 8.66 
Current Age (Mean)   
Current Age  (Yrs) 30.82 35.71 
Marital Status %   
Married 70.46 85.78 
Not Married 29.54 14.22 
Dependents %   
One Dependent or Less 56.75 29.64 
Two Dependents or More 72.25 88.35 
Commission Source%   
Air Force Academy 24.39 22.25 
ROTC 44.66 54.81 
OTS & Other Sources 30.96 22.93 
Career Field%   
Operations (Ops) 50.31 53.90 
Logistics (Log) 9.02 8.55 
Support (Spt) 22.08 21.06 
Acquisition & Financial Mgt (AQF) 17.27 16.02 
Special Duty (SD) 1.32 0.47 
Prior Enlisted Experience%   
Prior Enlisted Experience 24.52 21.49 
No Prior Enlisted Experience 75.48 78.51 
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Current Months in Grade (Mean)   
Current Months in Grade  28.72 19.28 
Current Education%   
Baccalaureate Degree 73.57 31.94 
Master’s Degree or Above 26.43 68.06 
Source: Author 
 
The demographics of each grade differ slightly, which is not unexpected given 
that the promotion points differ by roughly six years.  Immediately, it can be seen that the 
proportion who voluntarily separate is larger for O3 officers than for O4 officers, 18 and 
3 percent, respectively.  This is in part driven by officers fulfilling the term of service and 
wishing to pursue other opportunities at the O3 point.  Further, the O3 separation rate 
may be influenced by dissatisfaction with military life or possibly poor job-match.  
Moreover, an officer staying to the grade of O4 may be inclined to make the Air Force a 
career, but may also be influenced by the risk aversion associated with searching for a 
new career.      
The demographics indicate that there are slight differences between the grades, 
with white, married males comprising the majority of the LAF population.  One notable 
difference is the larger percent of married officers and officers with dependents among 
those at the O4 grade.  This can be explained in part by the decision to start a family as 
one matures.  The average age of Captains is 30.82 years and for Majors it is 35.71 years.   
The professional factors show that the majority of commissioned officers at the 
rank of Captains are accessed through ROTC, followed by OTS and other sources, and 
then the AFA at 44.66, 30.96, and 24.39, percent respectively.  For the rank of Major, the 
commissioning source shows similar composition at 54.81, 22.93, and 22.25 percent.  
Career fields see some small differences between grades with operations and support 
officers comprising the largest career fields for both.  The statistics show personnel with 
prior enlisted experience comprise 24.52 percent of the Captain population and 21.49 of 
the Major population.   
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The one notable change between the grades is the level of education, with Majors 
possessing a higher percentage of advanced degrees.  Officers holding a baccalaureate 
degree comprise 73.57 percent of the Captain population but only 31.94 percent of the 
Major population. 
Tables 10 and 11 provide information about how the characteristics of LAF 
officers are related to the decision to either voluntarily separate or stay in the Air Force.  
These tables show how retention rates vary by the explanatory variables for each grade.   
 
Table 10.  Distribution of Captain “Leavers” and “Stayers” by Background 
Characteristics 
(percent and mean) 
 
 Captain “Leavers”
N = 3802 
Captain “Stayers 
N=16923 
Gender%***   
Male 16.51 83.49 
Female 27.29 72.71 
Race%*   
White 18.70 81.30 
Black 16.41 83.59 
Other Race 17.13 82.87 
Current Age (Mean)+   
Current Age  (Yrs) 29.14 31.19 
Marital Status %***   
Married 15.63 84.37 
Not Married 24.81 75.19 
Dependents %***   
One Dependent or Less 22.82 77.18 
Two Dependents or More 14.85 85.15 
Commission Source%***   
Air Force Academy 21.49 78.15 
ROTC 20.09 79.91 
OTS & Other Sources  13.36 86.64 
Career Field%   
Operations (Ops) 12.61 87.39 
Logistics (Log) 18.72 81.28 
Support (Spt) 24.93 75.07 
Acquisition & Financial Mgt (AQF) 26.32 73.68 
Special Duty (SD) 19.78 80.22 
Prior Enlisted Experience%***   
Prior Enlisted Experience 6.16 93.84 
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 Captain “Leavers”
N = 3802 
Captain “Stayers 
N=16923 
No Prior Enlisted Experience 22.30 77.70 
Current Months in Grade (Mean)+   
Current Months in Grade  26.90 29.12 
Current Education%***   
Baccalaureate Degree 18.89 81.11 
Master’s Degree or Above  16.82 83.18 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chisq statistic significant at .10 level 
+     T-statistic for difference in means significant at .01 level 
Source: Author 
 
Table 11.  Distribution of Major “Leavers” and “Stayers” by Background 
Characteristics 
(percent and mean) 
 
 Major “Leavers” 
N = 233 
Major “Stayers 
N=6548 
Gender%***   
Male 3.18 96.82 
Female 5.69 94.31 
Race%   
White 3.52 96.48 
Black 1.61 98.39 
Other Race 3.75 96.25 
Current Age (Mean)+   
Current Age  (Yrs) 33.85 35.77 
Marital Status %***   
Married 3.15 96.85 
Not Married 5.19 94.81 
Dependents %**   
One Dependent or Less 4.88 95.12 
Two Dependents or More 3.24 96.76 
Commission Source%***   
Air Force Academy 6.96 93.04 
ROTC 2.80 97.20 
OTS & Other Sources  1.54 98.46 
Career Field%   
Operations (Ops) 4.79 95.21 
Logistics (Log) 1.72 98.28 
Support (Spt) 2.03 97.97 
Acquisition & Financial Mgt (AQF) 1.66 98.34 
Special Duty (SD) 3.12 96.88 
Prior Enlisted Experience%***   
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 Major “Leavers” 
N = 233 
Major “Stayers 
N=6548 
Prior Enlisted Experience 0.62 99.38 
No Prior Enlisted Experience 4.21 95.79 
Current Months in Grade (Mean)+   
Current Months in Grade  12.28 19.53 
Current Education%***   
Baccalaureate Degree 5.59 94.41 
Master’s Degree or Above  2.43 97.57 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chisq statistic significant at .10 level 
+     T-statistic for difference in means significant at .01 level 
Source: Author 
 
Table 11 indicates that, for the rank of Captain, a larger percentage of males stay 
in the Air Force at 83.49 percent as compared to females at 72.71 percent.  For the rank 
of Major, the difference in separation percentage by gender is not as pronounced, being 
96.82 for males and 94.31 for females.  Of interest is how the percentage of females 
deciding to stay increases between grades.  This change could be in part be explained by 
some females opting to separate in order to raise a family or pursue civilian opportunities 
at the end of their initial commitment,  with the others deciding to make the Air Force a 
career.  The similar retention rates for men and women at the O4 level may indicate that 
there is no “glass ceiling” perceived by females at the rank of Major and that they 
perceive the same opportunities as their male counterparts.  With respect to race, while 
whites makes up the majority of the officer population, minorities have slightly better 
retention rates at the rank of Captain.  Similarly, at the rank of Major, blacks have the 
highest retention rate, 98.39 percent, followed closely by Whites, 96.48 percent, and 
others, 96.25.  This could be a result of minorities preferring the military lifestyle to 
comparable civilian opportunities, which might be reinforced in part, by the equal 
employment opportunities afforded in DoD.  Current age shows that Captains, on 
average, decide to separate at age 29 and Majors at almost 34, which is approximately 
two years sooner than the stayers.  Marital status shows that married personnel make up 
the largest percentage of the population, but are less likely to separate at 84.37 versus 
5.63 percent and 96.85 versus 3.15 percent for O3s and O4s, respectively, as compared to 
officers who are not married.  Captains with two or more dependents are also more likely 
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to stay in the Air Force at 85.15 percent, as compared to their peers who have one 
dependent or less at 77.18 percent.  Retention improves substantially at the rank of 
Major, regardless of the number of dependents, with both groups having retention rates 
over 95 percent.  Both marital status and the number of dependents indicate that these 
factors may have more influence on retention behavior at the grade of Captain as 
compared to the grade of Major. 
Professional factors show that officers who received their commission through 
OTS and other sources have the highest retention rate in the Captain sample at 86.64 
percent, followed by ROTC at 79.91 percent, and the AFA at 78.51.  Similarly, for 
Majors, officers commissioned through OTS have the best retention rate, but all sources 
are above 93 percent.  While the initial commitments for these groups are the same, four 
years, any differences between the groups might be explained by taste for military 
lifestyle, with OTS graduates possibly having a higher satisfaction with military life 
based on previous experience since a majority of this population is prior enlisted.  
Surprisingly, AFA graduates had the lowest retention rates.  Regarding career fields, the 
best retention rate at Captain is in for operations at 87.39 percent; however, this career 
field also makes up the largest percentage of officers.  The other career fields see the 
largest exodus at the rank of Captain with those in the Support and Acquisition & 
Financial Management suffering the most retention problems at 24.93 and 26.32 percent 
respectively.  This may in part be due to available civilian opportunities for AFSs who 
have a direct civilian equivalent occupation.  At the rank of Major, all career fields have a 
retention percentage above 95 percent, with those in operations having the highest 
separation percentage at 4.79 percent.  The majority of officers do not have prior duty 
experience (see Tables 10 and 11), but those that do have a higher retention rate than 
those who do not.  Current months in grade for Captains indicate that those selecting to 
separate do so at almost the 27-month point, which indicates that they stayed in the Air 
Force over two years longer than their initial 4-year commitment, but about a month less 
than the general Captain population.  This indicates that an additional commitment was 
probably incurred above either the initial commitment of four years or the presence of 
other influences that initially made them stay on active duty, which in turn may have lost  
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their effect on remaining on active duty.  For the rank of Major, current months in grade 
was around 12 for those separating, which indicates that, on average, separating officers 
only stayed six months longer than the required 6 months after pin-on.   
Regarding education, the primary focus of this research, Table 10 indicates that 
only 81.11 percent of Captains who possess only a baccalaureate degree are retained, 
while Captains possessing more advanced levels of education stay at a higher rate, 83.18 
percent.  The relationship of education level and retention changes substantially at the 
rank of Major, especially among those officers possessing an advanced degree (see Table 
11).  Over 3 percentage points separate the retention rates for Majors holding an 
advanced degree and those who do not.  This may indicate that the possession of an 
advanced degree can serve as a retention tool, possibly due in part to an additional 
incurred service and perhaps their firm-specific education residing in DoD.  Normally, an 
additional commitment of two years is required for individuals using tuition-assistance 
with those attending in-residence program owing three years.  Given the additional time 
commitment, some officers who were undecided about their future, may elect to become 
stayers.  Further, the literature review indicated that employees with firm-specific 
training have less incentive to leave a firm since their particular skills may only exist in 
certain fields or industries.    
Table 12 displays a cross tabulation that shows the combined distribution, in 
percentages, of education level and career field by the decision to “stay” or “leave.”  Of 
particular note, Table 12 highlights that certain career fields may have more advanced 
education requirements and, in turn, greater opportunities to attend in-residence programs 
or at least place greater emphasis on obtaining an advanced degree.  Additionally, it 
shows that officers in the acquisition and financial management (AQF)  have the highest 
levels of education, by percentage, among those choosing to stay as well as leave.  
Table 13 provides further analysis on education level by career field.  The results 
indicate that at the rank of Captain, AQF officers possess the highest level of education 
with officers possessing a master’s degree or higher comprising 46.27 percent of the 
career field.  The other career fields have the following percentages of officers possessing 
an advanced degree:  support (33.62 percent); logistics (29.84 percent); operations (16.07 
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percent); and special duty (17.95 percent).  The composition nearly doubles for each 
career field at the rank of Major, where the majority of officers possess an advanced 
degree.  The breakout for each career field, from largest to smallest, is the following:  
AQF (88.49 percent); special duty (87.50 percent); support (76.75 percent); logistics 
(75.86 percent); and operations (57.18 percent).  This trend change indicates that as 
officers assume more managerial positions as they rise in rank, that acquiring a degree 
may be more beneficial, but also that opportunities may be more prevalent to obtain an 
advanced degree.   
 





 Ops Log Spt AQF SD Ops Log Spt AQF SD 
Baccalaureate 
 Degree 




27.53 43.49 48.67 61.09 26.40 20.07 24.72 24.02 36.77 20.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.  
Source: Author  
 





 Ops Log Spt AQF SD Ops Log Spt AQF SD 
Baccalaureate 
 Degree 




16.07 29.84 33.62 46.27 17.95 57.18 75.86 76.75 88.49 87.50
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.  
Source: Author  
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In summary, there are several differences between those who choose to stay and 
those selecting to separate in the focus areas.  Regarding voluntary retention separation 
behavior, the largest exodus occurs at the rank of Captain with a significant decline in 
departures occurring at the Major.  LAF officers choosing to be retained early in their 
careers as Captains are more likely to be married males, who have two dependents or 
more, but there is no large difference regarding race.  Professional factors indicate this 
group is more likely to be commissioned through OTS and work in the operations career.  
Education factors indicate that they are more likely to separate if they only possess a 
baccalaureate degree.  The demographics for Majors deciding to be retained are not 
different from those who leave at the rank of Captain, with one major difference being 
that females are about as likely as males to be retained.  One noteworthy demographic for 
the Major population, is that the average separation age is almost 34, whereas for those 
choosing to stay in the Air Force the average age is almost 36.  Professional factors 
indicate that operations personnel and AFA graduates are more likely to separate at the 
rank of Major; however, overall there is not much variation between career fields or 
source of commission.  While ROTC and OTS graduates have a slightly higher retention 
rate, than those from the AFA, all three sources have a retention rate above 93 percent.  
Similarly, there is little difference in retention behavior between career fields, with 
retention rates all being above 95 percent.  The information about education level shows 
that officers holding an advanced degree are more likely to be retained among both 
Captains and Majors.  Figure 2 shows education levels by grade for those voluntarily 
























Baccaluarate Deg Master's Deg or Above
 
Figure 2.   Education Level by Retention Decision 
Source: Author 
 
3. Data Description for Retention and Promotion  
Table 14 provides statistics about the sample used for the analysis of promotion.  
These officers are those among the target group of Captains (O3) in the retention sample 
who were retained (“stayers”) and who were eligible to be promoted or not promoted to 
the next grade of Major.  Due to time-in-grade requirements, of the 16,923 officers that 
were retained in the Air Force, only 6,781 are promotion eligible.  Frequency 
distributions and cross tabulations were used to describe the dependent and explanatory 
variables,  first as a total sample encompassing all year groups and also by looking at the 
year groups of 1993 and 1994 independently and as a pooled sample, specifically to 
examine the effects due to an education policy change in 2003.  This allows for some 
comparisons between the overall sample and the two years of particular interest.   
Officers eligible for promotion during this time were commissioned between 1992 
and 1997.  Those commissioned in 1997 were excluded, since the data were incomplete 
and may not have completely captured any pending promotions.  Therefore, 200 
observations were excluded from the overall sample leaving the total observations at 
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6,581.  The data in Table 13 are shown as either a percentage of the sample or an overall 
mean.  These data are used to provide an understanding of the dynamics of the sample 
and help formulate hypotheses of the effects of the explanatory variables on retention and 
subsequent promotion behavior of the group. 
 
Table 14.  Characteristics of LAF Officers Eligible for Promotion  














Promotion%     
Promote 98.54 99.72 97.84 98.75 
Gender%     
Male 89.86 90.68 90.81 90.77 
Female 10.14 9.32 9.19 9.25 
Race%     
White 85.56 85.69 87.49 86.62 
Black 5.67 4.04 5.39 4.73 
Other Race 8.77 10.27 7.13 8.65 
Current Age (Mean)     
Current Age  (Yrs) 35.71 35.89 35.27 35.57 
Marital Status %     
Married 85.55 86.81 85.69 86.24 
Not Married 14.45 13.19 14.31 13.76 
Dependents %     
One Dependent or Less 29.77 28.28 31.47 29.92 
Two Dependents or More 88.18 89.39 88.23 88.79 
Commission Source%     
Air Force Academy 22.84 29.80 27.61 28.67 
ROTC 55.51 49.83 46.25 47.99 
OTS & Other Sources 21.65 20.37 26.14 23.34 
Career Field%     
Operations (Ops) 53.29 52.27 51.85 52.07 
Logistics (Log) 8.57 9.76 9.35 9.55 
Support (Spt) 21.44 23.28 22.86 23.04 
Acquisition & Financial Mgt (AQF) 16.26 14.41 15.58 15.01 
Special Duty (SD) 0.44 0.28 0.36 0.33 
Prior Enlisted Experience%     
Prior enlisted experience 20.70 19.92 19.59 19.75 
No prior enlisted experience 79.30 80.08 80.41 80.25 
Current Education%     
Baccalaureate Degree 31.48 28.45 37.06 32.89 
Master’s Degree or Above 68.52 71.55 62.94 67.11 
Source: Author 
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The preliminary analysis in Table 14 summarizes the characteristics of LAF 
officers who are retained in the Air Force and subsequently become promotion eligible to 
the rank of Major.  The total sample shows that over 98 percent of those eligible for 
promotion were promoted to Major.     
The demographics vary slightly from year to year, but overall, males comprise the 
majority (over 90 percent) of the pooled sample.  Similarly, whites make up the 
preponderance of the pooled group at 86.62 percent with blacks, and other races 
comprising the difference of 4.73 and 8.65 percent, respectively.  While there is some 
greater variation between races in the year groups 1993 and 1994, it is very small.  
Likewise, there is no significant changes in the current age of the population with the 
overall sample age mean being over 35.71 years of age.  Marital status remains stable 
with the majority of the officers in the pooled sample being married at 86.24 percent.  
Dependent status also remains steady with officers having more than two dependents 
making up the bulk of the pooled sample at 88.79. This may be the result of married 
officers with several dependents enjoying the security and quality of life an Air Force 
career provides, but may also just represent the population as a whole that decides to 
make the military a career.   
The professional factors display some minor changes between years, but remain 
consistent.  The accession source shows that graduates from the AFA make up 28.67 
percent, ROTC 47.99 percent, and OTS and other sources the remaining 23.34 percent of 
the pooled sample.  Of particular note, OTS graduates show over 5 percentage points 
growth between the 1993 and 1994 groups, but overall there is little difference in 
accession sources.  Similarly, there are some small variations between the two time 
periods in career fields and prior enlisted experience, but over all, there are no significant 
variations. The majority of officers in the pooled sample, 80.25 percent, have no prior 
enlisted experience.  Operations remains the largest career field represented comprising 
52.07 percent of the pooled sample, followed by the other career fields of support, 
acquisition and financial management, logistics, and special duty at 23.04, 15.01, 9.55, 
and 0.33 percent, respectively.   
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The area of education shows the most dramatic change.  While not obvious in 
looking at the pooled sample, in examining the 1993 and 1994 cohort data it can be seen 
that there is distinct change in officer education levels, which in large part may be 
explained by the change in Air Force policy that occurred during this time period.  Under 
the new policy, education levels were masked when officers were evaluated for 
promotion, effective in 2003. Thus, the 1994 cohort was affected by this policy change 
while the 1993 cohort was not. In the 1993 cohort, 28.45 percent of the officers possessed 
only a baccalaureate degree.  This increased to 37.06 percent in the 1994, a change of 
over 8 percent, matched by a drop of 8 percent in advanced education between these two 
years.  This indicates that the change in Air Force policy may have had a negative effect 
on officers pursuing advanced education.  While the overall level of advanced degrees for 
the pooled sample is quite high at 68.52 percent, indicating that some career officers may 
decide to forgo advanced education in the near term while others still place a high value 
on it.      
Table 15 shows the relationship of the characteristics of LAF officers to 
promotion for the pooled sample.  Table 16 provides the same information for the two 
commissioning year cohorts.  This data combined with the information from Table 14 
provides useful information to help identify any differences between those officers that 











Table 15.  Characteristics of LAF Officers By Promotion Status, Pooled Sample 
(percent or mean) 
 




Gender%   
Male 1.17 98.83 
Female 2.06 97.94 
Race%**   
White 1.16 98.84 
Black 2.87 97.13 
Other Race 1.26 98.74 
Current Age (Mean)+ 34.70 35.58 
Current Age  (Yrs) 34.62 35.73 
Marital Status %***   
Married 0.95 99.05 
Not Married 3.16 96.84 
Dependents %***   
One Dependent or Less 1.82 98.18 
Two Dependents or More 1.04 98.96 
Commission Source%   
Air Force Academy 0.66 99.34 
ROTC 1.53 98.47 
OTS & Other Sources 1.40 98.60 
Career Field%   
Operations (Ops) 0.78 99.22 
Logistics (Log) 0.57 99.43 
Support (Spt) 2.60 97.40 
Acquisition & Financial Mgt (AQF) 1.27 98.73 
Special Duty (SD) 0.0 100 
Prior Enlisted Experience%   
Prior enlisted experience 1.10 98.90 
No prior enlisted experience 1.29 98.71 
Current Education%***   
Baccalaureate Degree 2.32 97.68 
Master’s Degree or Above 0.73 99.27 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chisq statistic significant at .10 level 









Table 16.  Characteristics of LAF Officers Promoted and Not Promoted- 93/94 Cohort 
(percent or mean) 
 













Gender%     
Male 0.31 99.69 1.98* 98.02* 
Female 0 100 4.02* 95.98* 
Race%     
White 0.26 99.74 1.99 98.01 
Black 0 100 4.90 95.10 
Other Race .55 99.45 2.22 97.78 
Current Age (Mean)     
Current Age  (Yrs) 35.2+ 35.88+ 34.63+ 35.28+ 
Marital Status %     
Married 0.19* 99.81* 1.66*** 98.34*** 
Not Married 0.85* 99.15* 5.17*** 94.83*** 
Dependents %     
One Dependent or Less 0.40** 99.60** 3.02** 96.98** 
Two Dependents or More 0.19** 99.81** 1.86** 98.14** 
Commission Source%     
Air Force Academy 0.38 99.62 1.32* 98.68* 
ROTC 0.23 99.77 1.13* 98.87* 
OTS 0.28 99.72 4.85* 95.15* 
Career Field%     
Operations (Ops) 0.21 99.79 1.32 98.68 
Logistics (Log) 0 100 1.13 98.87 
Support (Spt) 0.24 99.76 4.85 95.15 
Acquisition & Financial Mgt (AQF) 0.78 99.22 1.69 98.31 
Special Duty (SD) 0 100 0 100 
Prior Enlisted Experience%     
Prior enlisted experience 0.28 99.72 1.89 98.11 
No prior enlisted experience 0.28 99.72 2.23 97.77 
Current Education%     
Baccalaureate Degree 0.59 99.41 3.56*** 96.44*** 
Master’s Degree or Above 0.16 99.84 1.34*** 98.66*** 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chisq statistic significant at .10 level 





In examining the pooled sample, the demographics indicate that males are more 
likely to be promoted to Major at 98.83 percent, as compared to females who were 
promoted at 97.94 percent.  The Race distribution in Table 15 indicates that overall 
whites are promoted at the highest rate, but there is no clear distinction between races 
indicating that they are promoted at a rate that is no different from the population.  
Marital and dependent status shows that married officers with two or more dependents 
are more likely to be promoted than those are not married with one or less dependents, 
but there is very little variation between these factors.   
Professional factors show that AFA graduates have the highest selection rate at 
99.34 percent and ROTC the lowest at 98.47 percent.  Regarding career fields, those in 
logistics have the best promotion rates at 99.43 percent with those in support the worst at 
97.40 percent.  Further, those with prior enlisted experience are promoted at 0.19 
percentage points higher than those who do not have prior enlisted experience.   
Regarding education, the statistics indicate there is very little difference in 
promotion rates based on education.  Officers possessing an advanced degree were 
promoted 1.59 percentage points higher than those who posses just a baccalaureate 
degree.   
In looking at the two specific years, the demographics indicate that there are only 
small differences between the two cohorts.  Of interest in the 1993 group, females and 
blacks were promoted at 100 percent.  Additionally, age indicates that the 1993 group 
was slightly older than the 1994 group.  Professional factors denote that there are no 
significant differences between the commissioning sources and career fields, with 
logistics personnel having the best promotion rate for each year group.  Prior enlisted 
experience indicates that those with prior duty promote at the same or higher rate than 
those without prior experience.  Education shows that officers with an advanced degree 
are promoted at a higher rate regardless of the year, but of interest is the change in overall 
education between years.  In 1993, it appears that the overall level of education was 
higher than compared to 1994.     
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In summary, there were no major differences in demographics and professional 
factors, which is to be expected given that the promotion is based being the “best 
qualified.”  While there are some small differences in education levels on those 
promoted, it was less than 2 percentage points for the overall sample.  Figure 3 shows the 
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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between graduate 
education and the performance of LAF officers.  Since it is difficult to measure the job 
performance of officers, some proxy measures must be used to measure differences in 
officer performance.  Two measures that can be used to evaluate this performance are 
promotion and retention behavior, according to human capital theory.  
1. Theoretical Model 
Logistic regression models can be used to explain the decision to leave the Air 
Force rather than voluntarily staying, as well as the event of being promoted.  This 
modeling technique provides a framework to describe the relationship between a binary 
outcome (dependent) variable and a set of independent (explanatory) variables.  This 
technique is commonly used when the dependent variable is binary, (1 = STAY and 0 = 
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LEAVE or, conversely, 1 = PROMOTE and 0 = NOT PROMOTE).  The logit model is 
associated with the cumulative logistic probability function where P is the probability of 
leaving/promoting and X is a set of explanatory variables.  The form of the general 
equation may be written as follows:  
 
Li= ln [Pi/(1- Pi)]= α + βxi 
where: 
Li= The log of the odds ratio 
Pi=The probability an individual stays given personal attributes xi 
α= The intercept parameter 
β= The direction (vector) of the slope of explanatory variable coefficients 
xi= Values of explanatory variables in the model 
For examining retention, the two models are estimated, one for O3s and one for 
O4s, using a maximum likelihood technique.  To examine promotion to Major, the 
maximum likelihood technique will also be used to determine why some officers are 
promoted and some are not. A difference-in-difference estimator is included in the 
promotion model.  The difference-in-difference estimator is used to determine if the 
effect of advanced education on promotion is different after the change in education 
policy in 2003.  In 2003, the Air Force began masking educational records as a means to 
decrease the perception that advanced education was required for promotion to the rank 
of Major.  Cohort 1994 roughly corresponds to the policy change.  The treatment group 
will be those with advanced education, a master’s degree or higher.  The control group 
will be those who only possess a baccalaureate degree.  Overall, the effect being 
measured by the differencing estimator is whether there was a change in the effect of 
graduate education on promotion associated with the change in policy between the two 
periods. 
The signs of the individual coefficients will indicate whether an explanatory 
variable is associated with either increasing or decreasing the probability of retention and 
subsequent promotion.  A positive sign for a parameter estimate indicates an increase in 
the probability of staying in the case of retention and an increase in the probability of 
promotion for the promotion model.  
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2. Logit Model 
Listed below are the models used in the analysis as well as a list of the 
explanatory variables.  A full description of variables and their expected effects are 
discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. 
a. Retention Models for Captain and Major 
Li= ln [Pi/(1- Pi)]= β0 + β1(Female) + β2(Black) + β3(Other) + β4(NotMar) 
+ β5(OneDep) + β6(Age) + β7(AFA) + β8(OTS) + β9(Log) + β10(Spt) + 
β11(AQFM) + β12(SD) + β13(PE) + β14(MIG)+ β15(MA)  
where: 
Female = Gender is female 
Black= Race is Black/African American 
Other = Other race is other than White or Black/African American 
NotMar = Not Married 
OneDep = One or no dependents 
Age = Current Age (Mean) 
AFA = Commissioned through the Air Force Academy (AFA) 
OTS = Commissioned through Officer Training School (OTS) or other 
source 
Log = Career field is logistics  
Spt = Career field is support 
AQFM = Career field is acquisition and financial management 
SD = Career field is special duty 
PE = Prior enlisted experience 
MIG = Months in Grade (Mean) 
MA = Current education is a master’s degree or above 
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b. Promotion Model for Major 
Li= ln [Pi/(1- Pi)]= β0 + β1(Female) + β2(Black) + β3(Other) + 
β4(NotMar) + β5(OneDep) + β6(Age) + β7(AFA) + β8(OTS) + β9 (Log) 
+ β10(Spt) + β11(AQFM) + β12(SD) + β13(PE) + β14(FY04) + β15(BA) 
+ β16(FY04_BA) 
where: 
MA = Current education is master’s degree or above 
FY04 = Time trend common to control and treatment groups 
FY04_MA = Effect of treatment (education) post 2003 
3. Variables 
a. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable used for the retention model is constructed using 
the InterService Separation Codes from DMDC, which shows if an officer separated, the 
separation rank, and the rationale for the loss.  The dependent variable for retention is 
based on these codes.  Specifically, the codes indicating a voluntary separation or release 
from the Air Force are categorized as STAY =1, otherwise STAY =0.  These codes and 
the number of observations are shown in Table 8. 
The dependent variable used for the promotion model is initially based on  
data from the retention model where STAY = 1 and then promotion outcomes are 
determined by comparing the beginning rank information with the individual’s most 
recent rank after excluding any individuals who are not promotion eligible.  If an officer 
is promoted to Major,   the dependent variable is coded as PROMOTE = 1.  If the 
individual was not promoted then PROMOTE = 0.   
b. Independent Variables  
Independent variables are the explanatory factors referring to officers’ 
personal characteristics and professional backgrounds.  They are grouped into the 
following categories: Demographics, Professional, and Education.  Demographics consist 
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of gender, race, marital status, number of dependents, and age.  Professional factors were 
commission source, AFSC career groups, prior enlisted experience, and current years of 
months in grade.  Education consists of the level of education attained.  Each of the 
independent variables is described below. Table 14 provides a summary of the 
distributions for these variables: 
(1)  Demographics.  Gender (Male, Female).  The gender 
variable is a dichotomous variable.  The base case in the models is male as they make up 
a majority of the officer corps.  Females are represented in all of the AFSC career fields; 
however, there are several AFSCs within the Operations career field that are restricted to 
males in the special operations area.  Factors that may influence negative effects for 
females include the cultural norm that they are the primary caregivers for families so they 
may opt to separate more readily than males in order to raise a family, a male-dominated 
work environment, and historically lower promotion rates.  However, these negative 
effects may be offset by the trends in increased female recruiting and expanded job 
opportunities which allow women to pursue an Air Force career. The effect of the Female 
variable therefore is expected to be negative for retention but positive for promotion as 
compared to the base case.   
Race (White, Black, Other).  Race is a dichotomous variable with 
three categories.  The base case is white since whites comprise the majority of the 
sample.  The category of Other includes the race/ethnic groups of Asian, Pacific 
Islander/Native Hawaiian, Native American (American Indian/Alaska Native), and 
personnel of mixed descent, along with observations that are unknown.  Overall, the 
military is perceived to provide equal employment opportunities and therefore 
professional and advancement opportunities are for minorities are likely to be perceived 
as generally better when compared to the civilian sector.  As a result, the effects of the 
Black and Other race variables are expected to be positive in relation to the base case.   
Marital Status (Mar, NotMar).  The marital status variable is 
dichotomous with Married (Mar) as the base case, as it represents a majority of the 
sample.  The variable Not Married (NotMar) identifies personnel who have never been 
married or personnel who are divorced, legally separated, or widowed.  Given that 
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married individuals have a spouse, it is assumed that they are more likely to stay in the 
Air Force because of financial and job stability concerns as compared to someone who is 
Not Married.  However, this could be offset to some degree by the military lifestyle and 
its possible negative effects on spouse satisfaction.  Conversely, it may be easier for an 
individual who is Not Married to transition to the civilian job market since he/she may 
not have the same financial and job security concerns.  Using this information and the 
preliminary analysis, it is expected the effects of Not Married will be negative in 
comparison to the base case.  
Dependents (OneDep, TwoDep).  The dependent variable is 
dichotomous with 2 or More Dependents (TwoDep) as the base case since this group 
captures the majority of the sample.  One dependent or less (OneDep) will primarily 
capture the sample members who are single, and those who are married but do not have 
children.  Those with one or less dependents will have fewer familial and financial 
responsibilities as compared to the base case.  This will allow this group to focus more on 
career choices which might include transitioning to civilian employment or pursuing a 
career in the Air Force.  Therefore, the overall the expected sign of 1 Or Less Dependents 
is uncertain.  
Current Age (Age).  The Age variable is the current average age of 
an individual when the data was captured by DMDC as of 2006.   This variable is 
continuous and is measured in years.  As an individual grows older, his or her years of 
service increase, thus increasing his or her pay and benefits.  Increased age may also 
decrease the attractiveness of career change.  For these reasons, the Age variable is 
expected to have a positive effect. 
(2)  Professional.  Source of Commission (AFA, ROTC, OTS).  
The source of commission is represented by a set of dichotomous variables.  Possible 
accession source are through the Air Force Academy (AFA), Air Force Reserve Officers 
Training Corps (ROTC), or through Officer Training School (OTS).  The variable OTS 
also includes officers who received their commission through alternative sources such as 
the Air National Guard Academy of Military Sciences, the Aviation Cadet Program, 
direct appointment authority, or receiving a commission from one of the other academy’s 
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and laterally transferring into the Air Force.  ROTC is the base case since these 
individuals make up the largest percentage of the sample.  It is anticipated that those who 
received their commission through OTS will be more likely to be retained or promoted 
since a majority of those individuals have prior enlisted experience and already have 
invested years in the military and have had a realistic job preview.  Similarly, those who 
received their commission through the AFA have demonstrated a preference for the 
military lifestyle and therefore may be more likely to stay and to be promoted.  However, 
some personnel may have attended the AFA with uncertain career aspirations, which 
have since been influenced by dissatisfaction with the military or career specialization 
along with career options in the civilian sector.   
Career Field (Ops, Log, Spt, AQF, SD).  Career field is a set of 
dichotomous variables that were created using the DoD Occupation Codes rather than 
using AFSC data directly, since the Air Force AFSC structure changed in 1993.  The base 
case selected was operations (Ops) since this career field makes up the largest percentage 
of the sample of officers.  Although there are some AFSCs within this career field that 
are directly transferable to civilian life, the majority are unique to DoD.  Logistics (Log) 
is seen to be likely to have a positive effect as compared to operations, since this career 
field has the fewest officers, offering unique leadership responsibilities coupled with 
unique DoD career opportunities.  The support (Spt) and acquisition and financial 
management (AQF) career fields contain the most functions that have direct civilian 
counterparts but also provide unique responsibilities not available in the civilian sector, 
and therefore results are expected to be mixed when compared to the base case.  The 
special investigation career field was grouped under the support career field for purposes 
of this study.  Special duty (SD) is expected to have a mixed effect as well, since this 
career field is sourced from other AFSs and contains both leadership positions and 
positions perceived as “grooming” for future jobs along with positions that may be 
perceived as detrimental to a career in the Air Force such as recruiting.   
Prior Enlisted Experience (PE, NOPE).  Prior Enlisted Experience 
(PE) is a dichotomous variable, which indicates whether an officer has any previous 
enlisted experience.  It is based on using the begin year of service variable as a proxy to 
determine whether an individual has previous enlisted time.  Officers having no prior 
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enlisted experience (NOPE) are the base case since the majority of officers do not have 
prior enlisted service.  If an individual has previous enlisted time, it is expected to have a 
positive effect on retention and promotion given the time invested along with 
demonstrated taste for a military lifestyle, compared with those with no prior enlisted 
service.      
Current Months in Grade (MIG).  This variable is the mean months 
of service an individual has accrued at his/her grade.  This variable is continuous and is 
measured in months.  It provides an estimate of when an individual was promoted along 
with when the next promotion opportunity exists.  As this number increases, it represents 
more time invested with the Air Force and may reflect risk aversion associated with 
searching for a new career.  For these reasons, the MIG variable is expected to have a 
positive effect on retention and promotion as it increases. 
(3)  Education.  Current Education Level (BA, MA).  Current 
level of education is a dichotomous variable with the base case being an individual 
possessing a bachelor’s degree since attainment of a four-year degree (BA) is normally a 
criterion for receiving a commission.  Officers who have attained a master’s degree, a 
professional degree, and those with post-masters work or a doctorate were classified as 
MA.  In general, human capital theory predicts that additional education has a positive 
effect on retention and promotion, however given the internal labor market of the Air 
Force and standardized pay systems based on time and grade, individuals may elect to 
pursue alternative employment to maximize their return on additional education, which 
would have a negative effect.  Overall, however, it is believed that MA will be positive in 
its effects on retention and promotion.   
Table 17 provides a summary of all explanatory variables and their 
expected effects on the dependent variables.  For purposes of simplification, only one 
table is used.  As such, if the expected sign is positive for the explanatory variable, then it 





Table 17.  Variable Names, Descriptions, and Hypothesized Signs 
 
Category Variable  Assignment Expected Sign 
Dependent Variables    
Voluntarily Separated LV 1 = Stay 
0 = Not Stay 
 
Promote Promote 1 = Promoted  
0 = Not Promoted 
 
Explanatory Variables    
Gender      
Male Male 1 = Male  
0 = Not Male 
Base 
Female Female 1 = Female  
0 = Not Female 
+/- 
Race      
White White 1 = White  
0 = Not White 
Base 
Black Black 1 = Black  
0 = Not Hispanic 
+ 
Other Race Other 1 = Other  
0 = Not Other 
+ 
Marital Status      
Married Mar 1 = Mar 
 0 = Not Mar 
Base 
Not Married  NotMar 1 = Single  
0 = Not Single 
- 
Dependents    
1 or Less Dependents OneDep 1 = OneDep 
0 = Not OneDep 
+/- 
2 or More Dependents TwoDep 1 = TwoDep  
0 = Not TwoDep 
Base 
Current Age Age Continuous + 
Accession Source 
(Commission Source) 
     
Air Force Academy AFA 1 = AFA 
0 = Not AFA 
+/- 
ROTC ROTC 1 = ROTC 
0 = Not ROTC 
Base 
OTS & Other Sources OTS 1 = OTS 
 0 = Not OTS 
+ 
AFSC Career Field      
Operations Ops 1 = Ops 
0 = Not Ops 
Base 
Logistics Log 1 = Log 
0 = Not Log 
+ 
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Category Variable  Assignment Expected Sign 
Support Spt 1 = Spt 
0 = Not Spt 
+/- 
Acquisition & Financial 
Management 
AQF 1 = AQF 
0 = Not AQF 
+/- 
Special  Duty SD 1 = SD 




   
Prior Enlisted 
Experience 
PE 1 = PE 
0 = No PE 
+ 
No Prior Enlisted 
Experience 
NOPE 1 = NOPE 
0 = No NOPE 
Base 
Current Months In 
Grade 
MIG Continuous + 
Current Education 
Level 
     
Baccalaureate Degree BA 1 = BA 
0 = Not BA 
Base 
Master’s Degree or 
Above 
MA 1 = MA 
























V. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Maximum likelihood (logistic) regression models were estimated to explain the 
decision to voluntarily stay in the Air Force, and for those who voluntarily stay, the 
likelihood of being promoted.  This was accomplished using the dichotomous dependent 
variable “Stay” for the retention model and the dichotomous dependent variable 
“Promote” for the promotion model.  Two models were constructed to examine retention, 
one for the rank of Captain and one for the rank of Major, across the time period from 
1992-2006.  Only one model was used to examine those who “Stay” and were 
subsequently “Promoted” to the rank of Major in the time period from 2003-2004.   
All the models included the same demographic, professional, and education 
variables, with the exception of time in grade, which was excluded from the promotion 
model.  Further, the promotion model included a difference-in-difference estimator to 
measure the effect of an education policy change that occurred during the sample time 
period.  Its purpose was to measure the effects of a 2003 policy change that involved the 
masking of all educational background information for use in promotion decisions. 
Likelihood ratio tests were conducted to determine if the basic models are 
affected by the addition of specified explanatory variables along with several goodness of 
fit tests to verify accuracy and statistical significance of each model.   
B. MODEL RESULTS 
1. Goodness-of-Fit 
Goodness-of-fit measures the validity of the model.  Three methods were utilized 
to test the validity of the retention models.  One measure of goodness-of-fit, the global 
null hypothesis, tests whether or not any of the explanatory variables in the model explain 
the variation observed in the dependent variable.  The null hypothesis states that all of the 
coefficients are zero and have no effect on the dependent variable.  The alternative 
hypothesis states that at least one of the independent variables explains the variation 
observed in the dependent variable.   
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SAS provides three equivalent Chi-Square tests that can be used to test the 
null hypothesis that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero in the 
model.  Table 18 shows the results for one of the tests, the likelihood ratio, for the three 
models that indicate they are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  From this 
information, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the 
independent variables in each of the models explains the variation in the dependent 
variable, “Stay” or “Promote.”   
 
Table 18.  Global Null Hypothesis Test for Logit Models 
 
Model Likelihood Ratio DF Pr>ChiSq 
Retention Model for Captain 2318.9277 15 <0.0001 
Retention Model for Major 281.6815 15 <0.0001 
Promotion Model to Major 88.0140 16 <0.0001 
Source: Author 
 
A second technique to measure a model’s goodness-of-fit is based on the R-
squared value.  The basic R-Squared statistic measures the proportion of the variation in 
the dependent variable (“Stay” or “Promote”) that was explained by variation in the 
independent variables.  This provides a measurement of the predictive power of the 
model.  Generally, in logistic regression, the basic R-squared is not employed because it 
does not accurately depict the overall relationship between the dependent and explanatory 
variables.  This is because the maximum possible value for R-squared is less than 1.0 and 
logit regression by definition has a binary response, either 1 or 0.  Therefore, the Max-
rescaled R-square converts R-squared values to a scale that has 1.0 as a maximum.  
The R-squared and Max-rescaled R-Square values for this model are shown in 
Table 19.  While the two retention models have Max-rescaled R-square values of 17.23 
and 15.74 percent respectively, the promotion model had one of 18.80 percent.  This 
indicates that the explanatory variables in the retention models explain roughly 17 and 16 
percent of the variation observed in the dependent variable “Stay”, and almost 19 percent 
of the variation for the dependent variable “Promote.”  While a relatively lower R-Square 
is standard for logistic regression models, the low values for the models indicate that 
additional explanatory variables may be desirable to improve the model. 
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Table 19.  Basic and Max-rescaled R-Square for Logit Models 
 
Model Basic R-Square Max-rescaled R-Square 
Retention Model for Captain 0.1059 0.1723 
Retention Model for Major 0.0407 0.1574 
Promotion Model to Major 0.0237 0.1880 
Source: Author 
 
A third measure commonly used to measure goodness-of-fit for a logistic 
regression model is a classification table that sums correct and incorrect estimates.  
Classification tables provide a bias adjusted account of the number of events accurately 
predicted by the model and report them as a percentage.  The term “event” in the logit 
model means that an observation that this predicted, either “Stay” or “Promote,” actually 
occurs.  This percentage is referred to as the percent correctly predicted.  It is a measure 
of the number of correct predictions divided by the number of total observations.  The use 
of classification tables also provides a specificity percentage, which measures false 
positive and false negative predictions.  The probability level in the table is used to 
determine the percent correctly predicted by the model.  It is common to use a probability 
of .5 that the dependent variable was equal to one to determine the percent correctly 
classified.  A more accurate method is to use the actual number of successes in the model.  
For the retention models constructed, it is the number of observations where the result is 
“Stay”=1 of the total number of observations per model, which is the actual proportion of 
events in the sample.  Similarly, it is the number of observations where the result is 
“Promote”=1 for the promotion model.   
The actual proportion of events in each of the three models was .82, .96, and .98, 
and these cut-off values were used for determining the percent correctly predicted.  Table 
20 provides a summary of the percent correctly predicted for each of the models.  The 
classification table shows that the retention models correctly predicted 66.5 and 71.7 
percent of the events and non-events e.g., “Stayers” and “Leavers,” for each rank.  For 
the promotion model, the table predicted 82.5 percent of the events and non-events e.g., 
“Stayers” who were “Promoted” and “Stayers” who were not “Promoted.”  Further, the 
sensitivity results, the correct events predicted divided by the total number of events, 
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have a range of 66 to 83 percent. This indicates that other explanatory variables might be 
desirable to improve the robustness of the models and to increase the correct number of 
events predicted.   
 
Table 20.  Classification Table for Logit Models 
 
























.98 3005 26 20 625 82.5 82.8 56.5 0.7 96.0 
Source: Author 
 
2. Evaluation of Retention Models 
a. Interpretation/Evaluation of Coefficients  
There were 15 explanatory variables in the two retention models.  Among 
the 6 demographic variables, all were significant in the Captain retention model, with the 
exception of dependents.  In the Major retention model, only the black and female 
variables were significant, among demographic variables.  Professional factors were all 
significant for the Captain retention model, with the exception of the AFA variable.  In 
the Major retention model, all of the professional variables were significant, except the 
OTS and SD variables.  In both models, education was significant.  Parameter estimates 







Table 21.  Logit Regression Results for Retention – Captain 
 
Model Retention of Captains 
N=6781 
Variables Estimate Pr>Chisq 
Intercept*** -5.0094 <0.0001 
Female*** -0.3688 <0.0001 
Black*** 0.3388 <0.0001 
Other Race*** 0.3343 <0.0001 
Not Married*** -0.2577 <0.0001 
One Dep -0.0490 0.3289 
Age*** 0.2578 <0.0001 
AFA 0.0273 0.5506 
OTS*** -0.5619 <0.0001 
Log*** -0.9315 <0.0001 
Spt*** -1.1638 <0.0001 
AQF*** -1.1644 <0.0001 
SD*** -0.5364 <0.0001 
PE*** 0.4673 <0.0008 
Months in Grade*** -0.0179 <0.0001 
MA*** 0.2953 <0.0001 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chisq statistic significant at .10 level 
Source: Author 
 
Table 22.  Logit Regression Results for Retention – Major 
 
Model Retention of Majors 
N=3676 
Variables Estimate Pr>Chisq 
Intercept 0.2230 0.9047 
Female*** -0.7118 0.0004 
Black* 0.7125 0.0953 
Other Race -0.1134 0.6311 
Not Married -0.2608 0.2042 
One Dep -0.1013 0.5589 
Age 0.0627 0.2661 
AFA*** -1.19 <0.0001 
OTS 0.0629 0.8138 
Log** 0.7926 0.0189 
Spt** .5360 0.0131 
AQF*** 0.5370 0.0049 
SD -0.2359 .8249 
PE*** 1.3595 0.0009 
Months in Grade*** 0.0620 <0.000 
MA* 0.2643 0.0747 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 




Female was statistically significant in both models at 0.01.  The parameter 
estimates were negative, with the expected result being negative.  This indicates that 
females are less likely to stay in the Air Force as compared to their male peers and that 
gender is a significant factor in retention behavior.  
Both of the race variables were significant at the 0.01 level for the Captain 
retention model, but only Black was significant at the .10 level for retention at Major, 
with the base case being white.  The expected sign of these variables was positive, which 
was supported by the results in the Captain retention model for both variables, however it 
was only true for blacks in the Major retention model.  The Other Race variable had a 
negative sign in the Major retention model, which was surprising.  This could be a result 
of the small sample.  A test for joint significance was performed to see if together, Black 
and Other were significant in the model, and they were found to be jointly significant at 
the 0.01 level in the Captain retention model but not for the Major retention model.  
Therefore, we can conclude that Race plays a role in retention behavior for Captains but 
not for Majors.  
For the marital status variable, Married was the base case with Not 
Married (NotMar) being modeled.  The expected sign for NotMar was negative.  The 
parameter estimates for Not Married were negative in both models, but only significant at 
the 0.01 level in the Captain retention model.  One possible reason that Not Married was 
not significant in the Major retention model is collinearity between marital status and the 
OneDep variable, which measures whether an officer has one or fewer dependents.  
Therefore, we can only conclude that  not being married has a significant negative effect 
on retention behavior for Captains, when compared to married officers  
The variable OneDep was found to be insignificant in both models.  The 
sign of the parameter estimated was expected to be mixed, but the results indicated that 
having one dependent or less was negative.  One possible reason that OneDep was not 
significant in both models is collinearity with the marital status variable of Not Mar, 
since the majority of the sample who are not married will not have dependents.  
Therefore, we can only conclude that the number of dependents is not a significant factor 
as modeled. 
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The Age variable was statistically significant for the Captain retention 
model but not for the Major retention model.  It was positive in both cases, which was the 
expected result.  We can therefore conclude that as age increases, it has a strong, positive 
effect on retention behavior of Captains, but is not as significant for Majors.  One 
possible reason that age is not significant for Majors is possible collinearity between Age 
and the PE and OTS variables, since prior enlisted personnel are typically older than their 
peers, and the majority of PE officers  went through OTS to receive their commission. 
The commissioning source variables of AFA and OTS showed some 
interesting results, with the base case being ROTC.  While the sign of the parameter 
estimate for AFA was expected to be mixed, the parameter estimate OTS was expected to 
be positive.  In the Captain retention model, the parameter estimate for AFA was positive 
but not significant whereas the parameter estimate for OTS was negative and significant.  
However, in the Major retention model, the opposite occurred with the parameter 
estimate being negative for AFA and significant, and the parameter estimate for OTS 
being positive and not significant.  Collinearity may be a factor with the OTS sample, as 
discussed above.  The results may also be biased since the OTS sample as modeled, 
includes observations for officers who were accessed from other sources, whose behavior 
might differ from those whom were accessed through OTS.  A test for joint significance 
was performed to see if source of commission was significant in both models.  It was 
found to be significant in both models.  We can therefore only conclude that officers 
commissioned through the AFA display negative retention behavior at the rank of Major, 
and officers commissioned through OTS and other sources display negative retention 
behavior at the rank of Captain compared with officers commissioned through ROTC. 
The Career field variables all displayed negative parameter estimates for 
the Captain retention model at the 0.01 significance level.  While the parameter estimates 
were expected to be mixed, with the exception of Log career field, the results indicate 
that officers in the Spt and AQF career fields have higher separation rates than those in 
the base case of  Ops.  The results in the Major retention model show the reverse effects, 
with the parameter estimates being positive for all the variables, with the exception of 
SD, which was negative and insignificant.  A test for joint significance was performed to  
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see if career fields together were significant, which they were in both models.  This 
indicates that job-selection, along with career-progression opportunities, influence an 
officer’s decision to leave or stay at the rank of Captain.     
Prior enlisted experience, PE, displayed positive estimates for both models 
at the 0.01 significance level.  This was the expected sign indicating that a prior enlisted 
officer is more likely to stay than someone who does not have prior enlisted experience, 
which was the base case.  Collinearity may be a possible concern with this variable and 
the OTS and Age variables.   
The parameter estimate for the variable months in grade (MIG) was 
negative for the Captain retention model but positive for the Major retention model.  
While significant in both models, the expected sign for this parameter estimate was 
positive.  In hindsight, an expected negative sign f negative may be a more appropriate 
sign for the Captain model, given the “up-or-out” promotion system.  Similar to the Age 
variable, this variable should increase if an officer stays in the service, since it measures 
the time spent at a particular rank.  However, if an officer is not promoted, it will 
continue to increase, signifying that the officer was not promoted.   
The education variable, Master’s Degree or Above (MA), was statistically 
significant in both retention models at the .01 percent and .10 percent respectively.  The 
parameter estimates were expected to be positive, which they were, as compared to the 
base case of an officer just possessing a baccalaureate degree.  This indicates that an 
officer who holds an advanced degree is more likely to be retained as compared to a peer 
who does not.  This result supports human capital theory and previous research which 
indicates that possession of an advanced degree provides less incentive to leave an 
organization.  While the positive parameters may be small, the results support the 
business practice of employers supporting continuing education in return for increased 
employee aptitude and company loyalty.  While many employees often view health and 
retirement benefits as a primary consideration when evaluating whether to stay or leave 
an employer, educational benefits are another important benefit that is often a 
consideration in retention behavior.   
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b. Partial Effects 
The partial effects of the significant variables in the two retention models 
are determined by using the ‘notional person’ approach.  In this case, a white, married 
male with two or more dependents, who received his commission through ROTC, has no 
previous enlisted experience, has an AFS in the operations career field, and has a 
baccalaureate degree  For the Captain model, the mean age is 30.82 years and current 
months in grade is 28.71 months (2.39 years).  For the Major model, the mean age is 
35.71 years and current months in grade is 19.29 months (1.61 years).   
The partial effects of the significant variables in the models are 
determined by using the notional person approach, otherwise known as the base case 
person. The notional person is one who has characteristics that are comprised of the 
variables that were not included in the model. For the dichotomous independent variables 
the values were set to zero. If an independent variable was continuous the notional person 
was assigned the mean value. In this manner, the probability of staying or leaving is 
established for the typical LAF officer when compared to the overall base case for each 
individual explanatory variable. Therefore the calculated partial effects are the effects of 
changes in the dichotomous variables from zero to one and changes in the continuous 
variables of one unit and compared with the notional individual. 
Table 23 shows the partial effects for the independent variables for each retention 
model.  For the Captain and Major models, the notional person has a probability of 
staying of 91.8 percent and 97.5 percent respectively.   
 
Table 23. Partial Effects for Retention 
 






Female -0.03223*** -0.024842*** 
Black 0.02205*** 0.012673* 
Other Race 0.02179*** -0.002946 
Not Married -0.2150*** -0.007270 
One Dep -0.00374 -0.002617 
Age 0.01735*** 0.001489 
AFA 0.00203 -0.053117*** 
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OTS -0.05320*** 0.001496 
Log -0.10237*** 0.013626** 
Spt -0.13983*** 0.010308** 
AQF -0.13994*** 0.012990** 
SD -0.05026*** -0.006496 
PE 0.02884*** 0.018597*** 
Months in Grade -0.00135*** 0.001473*** 
MA 0.01956*** 0.005733* 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chisq statistic significant at .10 level 
Source: Author 
 
For a LAF officer with the same characteristics as the notional person, 
except the gender is female, the individual has a decreased likelihood of staying of 3.2 
percentage points at the rank of Captain and 2.5 percentage points at Major.  The race 
variables show that if an individual is black, the likelihood of staying increases by 2.2 
percentage points at the grade of O3, and 1.3 percentage points for blacks at the grade of 
O4, compared to a white officer.  If an individual is from a other race, the probability of 
staying increases by 2.2 percentage points at the grade of O3 but decreases at O4 by 0.29 
percentage points.   Marital status indicates that if an officer is not married, the likelihood 
of being retained decreases by 21.5 percentage points as a Captain but only 0.72 
percentage points as a Major.  Similarly, if an officer has one or less dependents, the 
likelihood of staying decreases by 0.37 and 0.26 percentage points for each rank.  For the 
continuous variable of age, the probability of staying increases by 1.7 percentage points  
for Captains and 0.14 percentage points for Majors for each additional year of age.   
The demographic results are similar to the results found in 2004 Annual 
Report by the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Military 
Services (DACOWITS).  The DACOWITS report found that married male and female 
officers with children were more likely to report an intention to remain in the military 
over married male and female officers without children.  Similarly, the report found that 
single male and female officers with children were more likely to report an intention to 
remain in the military than single male and single female officers without children.  
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Professional factors indicate that if an individual is commissioned through 
the AFA, he/she has an increased likelihood of staying in the Air Force as a Captain of 
0.2 percentage points, but a decreased likelihood of staying as a Major of 5.3 percentage 
points, when compared to the base case (ROTC). The opposite is true for those 
commissioned through OTS where the results indicate a decreased likelihood of staying 
of 5.3 percentage points at Captain, but an increased likelihood of staying as Majors of 
0.15 percentage points.  All the career fields displayed a decreased likelihood of staying 
as compared to the notional person in operations as Captains and an increased likelihood 
of staying as Majors with the exception of officers in special duty, which showed an 
increased probability of separating at 0.65 percentage points.  Prior enlisted experience 
shows that if an officer is prior enlisted, he/she is more likely to be retained at 2.9 and 1.9 
percentage points respectively for each rank.  MIG indicates the probability of staying 
decreases by 0.14 percentage points for Captains but increases for Majors by 0.15 
percentage points for each additional month in their current grade.   
Given that the focus of this research is on graduate education, the partial 
effects of the education variable is of greatest interest. Table 23 shows that if an officer 
has an advanced level of education e.g., a master’s degree, a professional degree, or post 
master’s work, he is almost 2 percentage points  more likely to stay in the Air Force as a 
Captain and 0.57 percentage points more likely to stay as a Major than an officer with 
just a bachelor’s degree.   
3. Evaluation of Promotion Model  
a. Interpretation/Evaluation of Coefficients 
There were 16 variables in the promotion model.  Among the 6 
demographic variables, only marital status and age were significant.  Several of the 
professional factors were significant including AFA and the career fields of Spt and AQF.  
Education was significant at the .10 level.  The variable FY04 was significant at the 0.01 
level and provides a common time period for the post-policy education change e.g., after 




had a positive or negative effect on promotion relative to the pre FY04 period.  It was 
negative but insignificant in the promotion model.  Parameter estimates and significance 
levels are shown in Table 24. 
 
Table 24.  Logit Regression Results for Promotion 
 
Models Promotion of Captain to Major 
N=3676 
Variables Estimate Pr>Chisq 
Intercept -5.0248 0.1609 
Female 0.0204 0.9641 
Black -0.2927 0.9641 
Other Race 0.0780 0.882 
Not Married** -1.211 0.0111 
One Dep .2486 0.5552 
Age*** 0.3113 0.0034 
AFA** 1.0244 0.0217 
OTS -0.5134 0.2657 
Log -0.0411 0.9576 
Spt*** -1.5278 <0.0001 
AQF** -0.9549 <0.0562 
SD 10.0706 0.9893 
PE -0.6885 0.2578 
MA* 1.5730 0.0890 
FY04*** -1.6163 0.0099 
FY04_MA -0.3183 0.7446 
*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 
*     Chisq statistic significant at .10 level 
Source: Author 
 
Female was statistically insignificant, but the parameter estimate was positive, 
which was the expected result. We can conclude that male and female LAF officers do 
not vary enough in their promotion behavior, which provides evidence that the promotion 
system is gender neutral.     
Both race variables were insignificant, with the base case being white.  
The expected sign of these variables was positive, which was partially supported by the 
estimated signs.  The race of Other had a positive sign but the race of Black had a 
negative sign.  A test for joint significance was performed to see if together Black and  
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Other were significant in the model, and they were found not to be jointly significant.  
Due to the low insignificance, we can conclude that race does not play a major role in 
promotion outcomes. 
For the marital status variable, Married was the base case with Not 
Married (NotMar) being modeled.  The expected sign for NotMar was negative and the 
parameter estimate for Not Married was negative and significant at the 0.05 level.  This 
indicates that Captains who are not married who are competing for promotion to Major 
have a decreased likelihood of being promoted when compared to married officers.   
The variable of OneDep was found to be insignificant in the model.  The 
parameter estimated was expected to be unknown, but the results indicated that the effect 
on promotion on of having one dependent or less was negative.  Therefore, we can only 
conclude that the number of dependents is not significant as it was modeled.   
The Age variable was statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the 
promotion model, which was the expected result.  We can therefore conclude that as age 
increases, it has a stronger, positive effect on the promotion behavior of Captains.   
The commissioning source variables of AFA and OTS had some 
surprising results, with the base case being ROTC.  The parameter estimate for AFA was 
expected to be mixed and OTS was expected to be positive.  The parameter estimate for 
AFA was positive and significant whereas the parameter estimate for OTS was negative 
and insignificant.  While part of this outcome could be explained by the OTS sample  
containing officers commissioned from other sources which might bias the results, it 
could also be the result of the promotion system just advancing the “best qualified” in 
that particular year.  Further collinearity may be a concern with the variables of PE and 
age for the OTS sample that may have influenced the results.  A test for joint significance 
was performed to see if source of commission was significant in the model and it was 
found to be significant at the 0.05 level.  We can therefore only conclude that AFA 
officers have a stronger likelihood of being promoted as compared to the base case of 
officers accessed through ROTC. 
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The Career Field variables all displayed negative parameter estimates for 
the promotion model, except for SD.  While the signs of the parameter estimates were 
expected to be mixed, with the exception of the Log career field, the results indicate that 
only officers in SD have an increased likelihood of being promoted.  The career fields of 
Spt and AQF were the only variables found to be significant.  A joint significance test 
indicated that together these career fields are significant.   
Prior enlisted experience, PE, displayed a negative estimate for the model.  
This was not the expected sign, but was insignificant.  Therefore, we can conclude the 
prior enlisted experience is not a factor in promotion.   
The education variable, Master’s Degree or Above (MA), was statistically 
significant at the .10 percent respectively.  The parameter estimates were expected to be 
positive, which was the case, as compared to the base case of an officer just possessing a 
baccalaureate degree.  This indicates that an officer who holds an advanced degree is 
more likely to be promoted.  This result supports human capital theory and previous 
research which shows that personnel who have attained an advanced degree are more 
likely to be promoted in an organization.   
The variable FY04 was significant at the .01 level and negative.  This indicates 
that officers who were eligible for promotion in 2004 were less likely to be promoted 
than those who were eligible in 2003.  This was the expected result, based on examining 
the promotion rates in the respective two years. (See descriptive statistics in Chapter IV).   
The interaction variable FY04_MA indicates whether or not the effect of 
education on promotion changed between 2003 and 2004.  The parameter estimate was 
negative as expected given the policy change that involved masking educational 
backgrounds in information used for promotion decisions.  This indicates officers 
possessing an advanced degree have a lower likelihood of being promoted in 2004 as 
compared to those in 2003.  However, this result was insignificant, which indicates that 
education levels in 2004 did not have a significantly different effect on the promotion 




b. Partial Effects  
The partial effects of the significant variables in the promotion model are 
determined by using the notional person approach as explained in Section 2b earlier in 
this chapter.  This methodology allows us to observe the probability of “Promote” when 
each individual explanatory variable is changed and compared to the overall base case.  
In the promotion model, the notional person is a white male, who is 
married, and has two or more dependents.  The mean age is 35.56 years.  The notional 
person also has the following professional and education attributes:  1) commissioned 
through ROTC; 2) AFS is in the operations career field; 3) the officer has no prior 
enlisted experience; 4) and the education level is baccalaureate.  Table 25 shows the 
partial effects for the independent variables for the promotion model.  For the model, the 
notional person has a probability of being promoted of 99.7.   
 
Table 25.  Partial Effects for Promotion 
 






Other Race 0.000216 
Not Married -0.005788** 












*** Chisq statistic significant at .01 level 
**   Chisq statistic significant at .05 level 




For a LAF officer with the same characteristics as the notional person, 
except the gender is female, the individual has an increased likelihood of being promoted 
at 0.00062 percentage points.  The race variables show that if an individual is black, the 
individual is 0.0092 percentage points less likely to be promoted than a white officer, but 
if the individual is from an other race, then the likelihood of being promoted increases by 
0.002 percentage points.  Marital status indicates that if an officer is not married, the 
likelihood of being promoted decreases by 0.57 percentage points.  Similarly, if an officer 
has one or less dependents, the likelihood of promotion decreases by 0.0006 percentage 
points, compared to the notional person with two or more dependents.  For the continuous 
variable of age, the probability of being promoted increases by 0.07 percentage points.     
Professional factors indicate that if an individual is commissioned through 
the AFA, he/she has an increased likelihood of being promoted at 0.18 percentage points, 
when compared to the base case (ROTC).  The results are similar for those commissioned 
through OTS with an increased likelihood of being promoted of 0.19 percentage points.  
Two of the four career fields displayed a decreased likelihood of being promoted as 
compared to the notional person in operations, with officers in Spt and AQF having 
decreased likelihoods at 1.0 and 0.05 percentage points respectively.  Prior enlisted 
experience shows that if an officer is prior enlisted, he/she is more likely not to be 
promoted by 0.28 percentage points.   
Given that the focus of this research is on graduate education and, in 
particular, the effect of the 2003 policy change, the variables for education level, cohort 
year, and the interaction of these variables are very important.  The partial effects of 
education show that if an officer has an advanced level of education e.g., a master’s 
degree, a professional degree, or post master’s work, he is almost two percentage points 
more likely to be promoted as compared to a fellow Captain who only possesses a 
baccalaureate degree.  The variable FY_04 indicates that an officer was 1.1 percentage 
points less likely to be promoted in 2004 as compared to 2003.  The partial effect for the 
difference-in-difference variable combines the FY04 variable with the education level, 
which indicates that an individual who possessed an advanced degree in 2004 was .12 
percentage points less likely to be promoted than one with the same education level in 
2003.  This illustrates that the change in Air Force policy had its desired effect although 
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the difference was not statistically significant, since the Air Force goal was to decrease 
the perception that advanced education was required for promotion to the rank of Major.   
4. Potential Problems with Models 
As with any modeling effort, one potential problem is omitted variable bias.  This 
occurs when important independent variables are either excluded or not available.  This 
bias can result in either a positive or a negative bias in the coefficients for the variables 
that are included in the model.  While the focus of this research is on graduate education, 
the low Max-scaled R-values indicate that other variables that were not included would 
have been useful in predicting outcomes.  Other variables that might improve the models 
results for retention might include survey information on quality of life issues, civilian 
economic employment indexes, or deployment information; for the promotion models, 
beneficial variables might include completion of Professional Military Education, 
Promotion Recommendation Form results, and awards. However, given that the focus of 
this thesis is on graduate education, it might also have been desirable to include the type 
of advanced degree obtained and the method, if it had been available, along with perhaps 
GPA and a measure of the quality of the educational institution.  
Another concern with logistic regression is the presence of multicollinearity, 
which is a strong correlation between the independent variables.  As discussed in the 
Interpretation/Evaluation of Coefficients section for each model, collinearity may be 
present in several of the variables.  The existence of collinearity may inflate the variances 
of the parameter estimates, which may result in the lack of statistical significance of 
individual independent variables, with the overall model still being significant.  The 
problem of multicollinearity can be overcome by simply taking out variables that are 
measuring the same thing, combining the variables involved in multicollinearity into a 
single variable, or by performing joint significance tests for a group of variables that are 
not individually significant, but highly correlated with each other. 
To check for multicollinearity, the models were checked using the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), which indicates if multicollinearity has increased the instability of 
the coefficient estimate.  While there is no established cutoff value to use with VIF to 
determining the presence of multicollinearity, values exceeding 10 often indicate 
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multicollinearity; in weaker models, such as in the case of  logistic regression, values 
above 2.5 may be a cause for concern (Allison, 1999).  While the sample size for the 
study was large, individuals VIFs with numbers that were greater than 2.5 were 
crosschecked with the correlation table.  The correlation table provides correlation factors 
to assists with ruling out collinearity.   
In the retention model for Captain, the variables of Age and PE had a VIF of 
above 2.5 and the variables of MIG, OneDep, and OTS had a VIF above 1.5.  In 
examining the correlation table, there was some correlation between the variables of Age 
with PE at 0.6987 and OTS at 0.5560 and months in grade at 0.2977.  This was expected 
given that prior enlisted personnel are, on average, older than their peers; the majority are 
commissioned through OTS; and as one matures at a given rank, the time in grade 
increases.  Similarly, there was some correlation between OneDep and NotMar at 0.5277, 
since those that are not married are less likely to have dependents.  A similar result 
occurred for the retention model for Major where a VIF above 2.5 was present in the Age 
variable.  In the promotion model to Major, VIFs above 2.5 were present for the variables 
of Age, FY04, and FY04_MA.  In crosschecking with the correlation table, Age had a 
sizable correlation with the PE variable and the OTS variable, as already described.  For 
the variables of FY04 and FY04_MA, a higher VIF was expected due to the interaction.  
While it might be desirable to construct a variable that might negate the effect of age on 
the other variables to rule out collinearity and perhaps add another variable to capture the 
range of dependents possible, these options were outside the scope of this research.   
Although sample size was not a concern for the two retention models, it was a 
concern for the promotion model.  While the sample size was deemed large enough to 
provide accurate results, the high promotion rates observed in the data are suspicious, 
which may have affected the statistical significance of the individual independent 
variables. 
C.  SUMMARY   
The two logistic regression models for retention were successful in determining 
that graduate education is a key factor in retention behavior for LAF officers.  In both the 
Captain and Major models, possession of an advanced degree improved retention by rates 
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of 1.96 percent and 0.573 percentage points respectively.  Additionally the models 
illustrated that gender, race, and career fields influence retention behavior.   
The promotion to Major model with a difference-in-difference estimator was 
partially successful in determining that the change in Air Force policy regarding 
education records being masked in 2003 had an effect on the role of advanced education 
in promotion.  While the expected result was negative, indicating that the policy change 
had the desired effect of minimizing the influence of graduate education on promotion, 
the significance level was too low to make any conclusions about the change.  A more 
robust sample for the years proceeding and following the policy change may be needed to 
draw definitive conclusions about the effect of the policy change.  Ideally, this would be 
actual Air Force promotion board results, so a thorough analysis could be conducted to 
differentiate between in-the-zone and above-the-zone promotions.  Further, a difference-
in-difference estimator could be used with data for additional year’s post-2003 to provide 



























This study sought to demonstrate the comprehensive value of graduate education 
to the Air Force.  It determined that graduate education is an important influence in 
retention and promotion behavior of LAF officers.  Not only does this information 
strengthen existing DoD policies that actively support education programs for the benefit 
of the organization, it also highlights several important individual outcomes, which 
include increased likelihood of promotion. Although this study was narrow in scope, 
several key indicators in addition to advanced education were identified that influence 
retention and promotion behavior.  This study also attempted to measure the possible 
effects of the Air Force policy change regarding educational records being masked for 
promotion boards in 2003. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to determine the relationship between 
graduate education and the job performance of Line of the Air Force (LAF) officers.  To 
measure performance, the proxy variables of retention and promotion behavior were 
utilized to examine the effects of graduate education at the rank milestones of Captain 
and Major with a sample comprised of officers commissioned between 1992 through 
2006. 
In examining retention behavior, it was found that graduate education has a 
significant positive effect on the retention of Captains and Majors.  It was determined that 
possession of an advanced degree, either a master’s degree, a professional degree, or 
completion of post-master’s work, increases the likelihood of an officer being retained by 
1.96 percentage points for Captains and 0.57 percentage points for Majors.  While these 
percentages are relatively small, this equates to an additional 133 Captains and 22 Majors 
who could be retained if they possessed an advanced degree based on the sample sizes 
used in the study.  Using this information combined with knowledge of critically-manned 
career fields the potential exists to help remedy some AFS short-falls.  For example, 
Captains in the support career field have a diminished likelihood of staying of almost 14 
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percentage points as compared to someone in operations.  Potentially targeting advanced 
education programs to this group, the Air Force might lower the separation likelihood of 
this group to only 12 percent. Further, combining this information with the other 
demographic variables, the potential exists to develop policies combined with other 
pecuniary programs that might improve retention for certain populations that might be 
under represented such as females and minorities.  These findings support previous 
research that has shown that educational benefits are perceived as an important benefit 
for military service.  
Of the other variables that were utilized in the two retention models, several were 
found to be significant in their effects on retention.  Specifically, gender (female) and 
career field (other than operations) were negative influences and race (other than white) 
and prior enlisted experience were positive influences on retention behavior for Captains, 
while gender (female) and career field positively affected the retention behavior of 
Majors.  This indicates that organizational improvements focused on Captains might 
improve the retention of females and that changes within career-fields e.g., career-
progression enhancements, might improve retention, particularly among scientists and 
engineers, in the acquisition and financial management career field.  These finding are 
consistent with other studies including DACOWITS and the last Air Force Scientists & 
Engineers Summit in 2001. 
Regarding the effect of graduate education on promotion, only promotion to the 
rank of Major was modeled given the near 100 percent promotion rate to Captain.  It was 
found that Captains possessing an advanced degree had an increased likelihood of being 
promoted of 1.9 percentage points.  Based on the existing Air Force guidance, this small 
percentage suggests that possibly the possession of an advanced degree may act as a 
differentiating factor among equally qualified candidates. Of particular interest among 
the other variables that were utilized in the promotion model, gender was found to be 
insignificant.  This indicates that the promotion system is gender neutral and that females 
had an equal likelihood of being promoted that was equal to that of their male 
counterparts, once other variables affecting promotion were taken into consideration. 
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2.   Secondary Research Questions 
The secondary questions that were addressed included reviewing whether the 
inventory of graduate education skills differs significantly among communities, 
investigating the perception that graduate education is necessary for promotion, and 
whether a change in Air Force policy regarding masking education records in 2003 had 
an effect on promotion outcomes.   
In reviewing the levels of education by career field, it was assumed that those in 
the acquisition and financial management (AQF) fields would have the highest levels of 
education given that this career field includes scientists and engineers.  While this 
assumption was correct at the rank of Captain with AQF officers comprising 46.27 
percent of the sample, what was surprising was the dramatic increase in levels of 
education, regardless of career field, at the rank of Major.  At the rank of Major, there 
was a two-fold increase in advanced degrees, with the following breakout by career field:  
operations (57.18 percent); logistics (75.86); support (76.75 percent), AQF (88.49 
percent); and special duty (87.50 percent).  While not a focus of this study, these numbers 
support the work by Alley et al., where advanced degrees are perceived as required for 
officers as they assume more managerial positions, which  occurs with a rise in rank.   
Through the literature review and the model results, the perception that graduate 
education is necessary for promotion was investigated in further detail.  While historical 
promotion rates indicate that those with an advanced degree were promoted at a higher 
rate than those with only a baccalaureate, this may be more a result of unobserved 
attributes that lead some officers to obtain an advanced degree and become more 
promotable.  Further, in research conducted by Thirtle involving interviews conducted at 
the Air Force Personnel Center, it was indicated that advanced education was the least 
important factor in the promotion decision, but an advanced degree could serve as a 
tiebreaker between otherwise equal officers.   
In 2003 the Air Force attempted to change this perception by making the decision 
to mask education records for promotion boards to the rank of Captain and Major.  In 
doing so, all academic information was masked for the selection board to eliminate any 
bias towards those with higher levels of education.  To explore this policy change, the 
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promotion model in this study incorporated a difference-in-difference estimator.  It was 
found that the change in policy had a negative effect on the promotion of those with 
advanced degrees, which was the desired result, but the significance level was too low to 
make any conclusions about the change.  This result implies that the change in policy 
may have a negative effect on overall education levels at the grade of Captain and Major 
with fewer officers obtaining advanced degrees for the specific purpose of increasing 
promotion likelihood.  While there is no statistical evidence of this shift in these results, it 
is implied by the recent reversal in Air Force policy where educational records will no 
longer be masked starting in 2008.  In the 2006 SECAF/CSAF Letter to Airmen, it was 
announced that starting in 2008 all advanced education will again be part of the 
promotion process since the 2003 policy change acted as a deterrent for officers pursuing 
an advanced degree. 
B. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of graduate education on the 
retention and promotion behavior of LAF officers.  The retention models clearly illustrate 
that graduate education has a positive and significant effect on retention.  While the 
results of the promotion model were also significant indicating that graduate education 
affects promotion positively, the data for the time period investigated indicate a very high 
promotion rate (over 98 percent) whereas the official promotion data indicates a 
promotion rate of around 93 percent which may have affected the promotion model 
results.  Therefore, a more robust sample for the two years of 2003 and 2004 should be 
obtained from the Air Force Personnel Center to reevaluate the true effects of the policy 
change.   
C.   POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of the finding in this thesis, several policy recommendations appear to 
be warranted: 
1)  The USAF should continue emphasize graduate education to all officers, both 
through in-residence and off-duty programs.  While the Air Force has made considerable  
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improvement through the developmental education concept, the potential exists to expand 
in-residence programs using an executive MBA model, where officers would only be 
required to be away from their duty station for several weeks of the program. 
2)  The USAF should explore new ways to make graduate education beneficial to 
both the officer and the Air Force.  While not a focus of this thesis, in examining the 
literature and the retention results, it appears that by properly phasing graduate education 
for some career fields, retention might be improved through the additional service 
commitments incurred.   
D.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis examined the effects of graduate education on retention and promotion 
of LAF officers at the grades of O3 and O4.  Follow-on research could focus on 
expanding the grades studied to include the senior grades of 05 and O6 and whether the 
influence of graduate education has a similar effect at these levels.  The addition of other 
variables such as civilian economic employment indexes, deployments, Professional 
Military Education, and information about the type and timing of graduate education 
obtained, would also improve the predictive accuracy of the models.  Of greater interest 
in the future may be to compare and contrast the effects of education from the time period 
of 2002 through 2009, to capture the effects of the two education policy changes along 
with the drawdown of the officer corps, which is occurring in 2006 and 2007.   
Without doubt, the Air Force is in a position to expand its capabilities by 
investing in the educational capabilities of its officers.  By focusing on efforts to make 
education an integral part of officer development, the Air Force will be continue to be 
able to meet the challenges of an unknown future.   
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